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Part One
L Court System Prior to the First Constitution
IN a proclamation dated June 3, 1849, General Bennett Riley,
acting governor of California, announced his intention to complete "the
organization of the civil government by the election and appointment
of all officers recognized by law," and designated August 1, 1849, as
the day "for filling the offices of Judges of the Superior Court, Prefects
and sub-Prefects, and all vacancies in the offices of 1st Alcade [sic] (or
Judge of First Instance,) Alcades [sic], Justices of the Peace, and
Town Councils."1  The "law" referred to was Mexican law set out in
statutes dated March 20 and May 23, 1837.2
The March 20 statute ("POLITICAL") prescribed the duties of
prefects and sub-prefects, ayuntamientos (town councils), alcaldes, and
justices of the peace. The May 23 statute ("JUDICIAL") provided
for a superior court (tribunal), courts of first instance (primeria in-
stancia), alcaldes, and justices of the peace.
The May 23 statute provided that the Superior Court (Tribunal)
of California should consist of four judges; the three senior judges were
to sit as the first bench (sala) and hear second appeals (en tercera in-
stancia), and the junior judge was to sit as the second bench and hear
first appeals (en segunda instancia). The courts of first instance, con-
sisting of one or more judges, were to be held in the chief town (caba-
cera) of each district, and were to exercise jurisdiction over all suits
and civil and criminal causes of whatever description except where
members of the clergy or military were privileged. According to Gen-
eral (Governor) Riley, the duties of prefects and sub-prefects corre-
sponded "in a great measure to those of District marshals and sheriffs." 3
1. Riley, Proclamation Recommending the Formation of a State Constitution,
or a Plan of a Territorial Government, in REPORT OF THE DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION
OF CALIFORNIA ON THE FORMATION OF THE STATE CONSITUTION IN SEPTEMBER AND
OCTOBER, 1849, 3-4 (J.R. Browne ed. 1850) [hereinafter cited as 1849 Proclamation].
Although California had been ceded to the United States by Mexico by treaty dated
February 2, 1848, Congress had failed to establish a territorial government for the area.
2. Halleck & Hartnell, Translation and Digest of Such Portions of the Mexican
Laws of March 20th and May 23rd, 1838, as are Supposed to Be Still in Force and
Adapted to the Present Condition of California, in REPORT OF THE DEBATES IN THE
CONVENTION OF CALIFORNIA ON THE FORMATION OF THE STATE CONSTITUTION IN SEP-
TEMBER AND OCTOBER, 1849, app. p, XXIV (J.R. Browne ed. 1850).
3. 1849 Proclamation, supra note 1, at 4. In his memoirs E.O. Crosby, a dele-
gate to the Constitutional Convention, wrote: "When we were about to disperse,
Sacramento having no Prefect the delegates from there requested Gen. Riley to
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Under the above statutes, judicial functions of alcaldes and justices
of the peace were limited to conciliations and minor civil and criminal
matters, but "by a custom not inconsistent with the laws" the office of
judge of first instance was "vested in 1st Alcade [sic] of the District.
'4
In 1851 former Justice Bennett, in his preface to the first volume of
California Reports (1851 ), stated it to be the belief "that judges of First
Instance were never appointed and never held office in California under
the Mexican regime, but the Alcaldes possessed the powers and jurisdic-
tion of judges of First Instance."5 This custom may explain the exercise
of almost unlimited judicial power by "first" alcaldes both before and
after the Occupation.8
appoint one and I was appointed. The Prefects were a sort of petty governor of the
districts. Their duties were executive and partly judicial and they had supervision of
the Town Councils." E. CROSBY, MEMOIRS OF ELISHA OSCAR CROSBY, REMINISCENCES OF
CALIFORNIA AND GUATEMALA FROM 1849 TO 1864, at 52 (C. Barker ed. 1945) [herein-
after cited as CROSBY MEMOIRS].
4. 1849 Proclamation, supra note 1, at 4.
5. Bennett, Preface to 1 Cal. at vii (1851) (italics omitted).
6. Orrin K. McMurray in The Beginnings of the Community Property System
in California and the Adoption of the Common Law, 3 CALIF. L. REV. 359 (1915),
quoted at some length from the writings of two Americans who served as alcaldes
after the Occupation. One was Rev. Walter Colton, a chaplain in the United States
Navy, formerly a professor of moral philosophy in Middleton, Connecticut, and a
newspaper editor in Washington, D.C.; the other, Stephen J. Field, who had practiced
law in New York with his brother David Dudley Field, and who later became a
member of the Supreme Court of California. Still later, he became a justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States.
The title page of Colton's book reads: THREE YEARS IN CALIFORNIA by Rev.
Walter Colton, U.S.N., Together with excerpts from the author's DECK AND PORT
Covering his arrival in California and a selection of his letters from Monterey. It
was published in 1850, and reprinted by the Stanford University Press in 1949, with
introduction and notes by Marguerite Eyer Wilbur. Under the date of July 28, 1846,
Colton wrote at 17: "Com. Stockton informed me to-day that I had been appointed
Alcalde of Monterey and its jurisdiction. I had dreamed in the course of my life, as
most people have, of the thousand things I might become, but it never entered my
visions that I should succeed to the dignity of a Spanish alcalde." Under the date of
September 15, 1846, at 55, Colton wrote: "The citizens of Monterey elected me to-
day alcalde, or chief magistrate of this jurisdiction-a situation which I have been
filling for two months past, under a military commission. It has now been restored
to its civil character and functions. Their election . . . devolves upon me duties
similar to those of mayor of one of our cities, without any of those judicial aids which
he enjoys. It involves every breach of the peace, every case of crime, every title
within a space of three hundred miles. From every other alcalde's court in this juris-
diction there is an appeal to this, and none from this to any higher tribunal. Such an
absolute disposal of questions affecting property and personal liberty, never ought to
be confided to one man. There is not a judge on any bench in England or the
United States, whose power is so absolute as that of the alcalde of Monterey."
Field's book was entitled PERSONAL REMINISCENCES OF EARLY DAYS IN CALIFORNIA
(copyright 1880) ("Printed for a few friends-NOT PUBLISHED.") It had been
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In "The Alcalde System of California," Judge Wilson wrote:
The proclamation of General Riley of June 3d, 1849, estab-
lished a new era in the political and judicial administration of Cali-
fornia. He called upon the people in the several districts to indi-
cate, by an election, the persons whom he should appoint as Judges
of First Instance and Prefects, and also in districts composed of
several primary ones, to indicate the persons who should be ap-
pointed Judges of Second Instance.
The Judges of Second Instance, when assembled in banco, con-
stituted the Superior Tribunal or Court of Appeals. But neither the
Courts of Second Instance nor the Superior Tribunal did any busi-
ness, except granting a few orders, before they were superceded
by the present judiciary. The Courts of First Instance originated
a large portion of the cases which went up on appeal to the
[State] Supreme Court.8
11. Constitution of 1849
The convention to "frame a State Constitution or a Territorial or-
ganization," proposed by General (Governor) Riley in his proclama-
tion of June 3, 1849, met on September 1, 1849, and by a vote of 28
to 8 decided to draft a "State" constitution.9 The delegates who voted
dictated to a stenographer in San Francisco in 1877. Field's REMNISCENCES along
with other materials and a foreword by Jos. A. Sullivan, was reprinted in Biobooks in
1950 with this on the title page: CALIFORNIA ALCALDE by Stephen J. Field, Late Justice
of the Supreme Court of the United States.
Field's oath of office as Alcalde is printed in CALIFORNIA ALCALDE at 154. It was
dated January 22, 1850, and refers to him as "First Alcalde of Yubaville in the
District of Sacramento." Referring to his experiences as alcalde, Field stated: "Under
the Mexican law Alcaldes bad, as already stated, a very limited jurisdiction. But in
the anomalous conditions of affairs under the American occupation, they exercised
almost unlimited powers. They were, in fact, regarded as magistrates elected by the
people for the sake of preserving public order and settling disputes of all kinds. In my
own case and with the approval of the community I took jurisdiction of every case
brought before me." Id. at 27.
7. Wilson, The Alcalde System of California, in Appendix to 1 Cal. at 559
(1851).
8. Id. at 577. An act passed by the Legislature of the State of California
February 28, 1850, abolished the courts of second and third instance, and trans-
ferred pending business to the State Supreme Court. Existing courts of first instance
were recognized as courts of the State, and were authorized to continue until super-
seded, with appeals to the Supreme Court. Cal. Stat. 1850, ch. 23, §§ 1-2, at 77.
Early court rules relating to appeals from courts of first instance will be found in C.
KENYON, A Gum TO EARLY CALIFORNIA COURT ORGANIZATION, PRACTICE ACTs AND
RULES, WITH THE TEXT OF CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT RULES, 1850-1853 (CALIFORNu
STATE LAW LIBRARY Paper No. 21, 1968). Rule 8 adopted by the Supreme Court,
June Term 1850, provided: "Appeals from judgments rendered by Courts of First
Instance shall be entered on the Calendar & brought to a hearing in the manner pre-
scribed in section 277 of the practice act approved April 22d 1850." Id. at 13.
9. REPORT OF THE DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION OF CALIFORNIA ON THE
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in the negative favored a territorial form of government, some going so
far as to propose a state government in the north, and a territorial gov-
ernment in the south. One delegate, W. M. Gwin, took it upon himself
to have copies of the Iowa Constitution printed and distributed, and
another, M. M. McCarver, moved that it be taken into consideration
"as a basis for the Constitution of California."1  It should be noted,
however, that the convention did not limit itself to any one source, but
had before it, and, presumably, took into consideration, the constitu-
tions of all the states."
On September 20, 1849, Myron Norton, chairman of the Drafting
Committee, reported upon an article entitled "Judicial Department."
12
K. H. Dimmick gave notice that he would present a minority report.
Consideration of the majority report was delayed until it could be trans-
lated into Spanish. Taken up by the Committee of the Whole on Sep-
tember 25, it was debated at length.13 The chief question was whether
the "Supreme Court of Appeals should be separate and distinct from
the District Courts.'
14
As first proposed, there were to be four Supreme Court judges,
each to try cases in separate circuits; three would sit as an appellate
court to review the judgments of the fourth. Arguments in favor of
this system were based on the economy of having fewer judges and,
therefore, less expense. Arguments against this system called attention
to the great amount of time that would be lost in traveling great dis-
tances between the trial districts and the places where the judges would
FORMATION OF THE STATE CONSTITUTION IN SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER, 1849, at 20-23
(J.R. Browne ed. 1850) [hereinafter cited as BROWNE DEBATES].
10. Id. at 24. It may be of interest to compare Mr. Crosby's account of this epi-
sode as set out in his memoirs: "When we arrived at Monterey it was understood that
Gwin had a copy (in fact we knew he had) of a state Constitution with open lines
and blanks to be filled in. He had in his pocket a combination of the State Consti-
tutions of Ohio and Iowa. He had it printed taking from the Constitutions of those
states what he liked and adding to it to suit himself, and had spaces to fill in what
might be required, and blank dates." CROSBY MEMOIRS, supra note 3, at 40. In a
letter dated August 8, 1849, J. Ross Browne, after referring to his chance meeting with
Gwin in San Francisco, stated: "Dr. Gwin laid before me his whole plan, which is this.
He came out to California to form a constitution and identify himself with the
political interest of the country. After forming a constitution he will undoubtedly be
made Senator of the United States from California. . . . He says I must be elected
Stenographer to the Convention." J. BROWNE, J. Ross BROWNE, HIs LETTERS, JOURNALS
AND WRITINGS 121 (L. Browne ed. 1969).
11. Blume, Adoption in California of the Field Code of Civil Procedure: A
Chapter in American Legal History, 17 HASTINGS L.J. 701, 718 n.63 (1966).
12. BROWNE DEBATES, supra note 9, at 153.
13. Id. at 212-39.
14. Id. at 223.
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meet to consider appeals. It was further argued that different combi-
nations of three of the four possible appellate judges might result in
contradictions, and that expense should not be a controlling considera-
tion. In deference to these arguments, a resolution favoring complete
separation of trial courts from appellate courts was adopted. 5
The article on the judicial department,' as finally adopted, is out-
lined below:
JUDICIAL TRIBUNALS
Supreme Court-to consist of a Chief Justice and two asso-
ciate justices.
District Courts-to be held by one judge in each district as
established by the Legislature.
County Courts-to be held in each county by the county
judge.
Courts of Sessions-to be held by the county judge and two
justices of the peace.
Municipal Courts-Legislature to establish such municipal
and other inferior courts as may be deemed necessary.
Tribunals for Conciliation-may be established by the Legis-
lature.
Justices' Courts-to be held by justices of the peace; the
number in each county, city, town, and incorporated village
to be determined by the Legislature.
JUDICIAL OFFICERS
Justices of the Supreme Court-first justices to be elected by
the Legislature; subsequent justices elected by electors of the
State; to hold office for 6 years.
District Judges-first judges to be appointed by the Legisla-
ture, to hold office for 2 years; later judges to be elected by
electors or respective districts, to hold office for 6 years.
County Judges-to be elected by voters of the county; to
hold office for 4 years.
Justices of the Peace-justices to be elected in each county,
city, town, and incorporated village.
15. Id.
16. CAL. CONST. art. VI (1849).
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OTHER OFFICERS
Legislature to provide for the election of a Clerk of the Su-
preme Court, county clerks, district attorneys, sheriffs, cor-
oners, and other necessary officers; county clerks to be ex
officio clerks of district courts.
SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION
Supreme Court-to have appellate jurisdiction in all cases
when the dispute exceeds $200, when legality of a tax, toll,
impost or municipal fine is in question, and questions of law
in all criminal cases amounting to felony; court and justices
to have power to issue writs of habeas corpus, and all writs
necessary to the exercise of appellate jurisdiction.
District Courts-to have original jurisdiction in law and in
equity in all civil cases where the amount in dispute exceeds
$200, in criminal cases not otherwise provided for, and in all
issues of fact joined in the probate courts.
County Courts-to have such jurisdiction in cases arising in
justices' courts, and in special cases, as prescribed by the
Legislature, but no other original civil jurisdiction; county
judge to perform duties of surrogate or probate judge.
Courts of Sessions-to have such criminal jurisdiction as the
Legislature may prescribe.
Justices of the Peace-powers, duties, and responsibilities to
be fixed by the Legislature.
VENUE AND RANGE OF PROCESS
No provisions.
L.W. Hastings moved to strike the provision which authorized the
Legislature to appoint the first justices of the Supreme Court. He
desired that the election of justices and other officers should be left to
the people.' 7  Myron Norton replied that members of the committee
were as much in favor of the election of judges as Mr. Hastings, adding
that he believed "a great majority of the members of this House are
in favor of leaving the election of these officers to the people."' 8  He
pointed out the difficulties of having an immediate election of judges,
17. BROWNE DEBATES, supra note 9, at 224.
18. Id.
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and Mr. Hastings' amendment was rejected.19 E.O. Crosby partici-
pated in the judicial department debates, but did not speak out on the
subject of the election of judges. In an account of the proceedings of
the convention in his Memoirs,20 Crosby wrote:
The other point that I took most interest in and did the most
work in connection with, was in the Judicial Dept. I took an in-
terest in the organization of the Judiciary of the State and did what
I could to direct the Organization according to my conceptions for
the best interest of the people. I was opposed to an elective Ju-
diciary, I doubt its policy now. . . . My idea was to give a life
term or during good behavior with a salary sufficient to ensure him
a fair competence enough to live on with something for his support
after he became too old for his work: and I did what I could to
prevent the elective judiciary. It went against me because the
sentiment of the Convention was the other way.
21
A matter discussed at length on the convention floor was a sug-
gestion by a Mr. Noriego "that the jurisdiction of the Appellate Court
should be limited to the sum of $200.''22 The time of the appellate
judges should not be occupied by "trivial disputes" often indulged in to
satisfy some whim or caprice or to gratify a malicious feeling against
the opposite party. Arguments against the limitation emphasized that
cases involving less than $200 often involve important principles of
law. In this connection it was suggested by J.M. Jones that exceptions
should be made in cases involving any tax, toll, impost, or municipal
fine.23  L.W. Hastings stated that he could not support the limitation
because "[it strikes fatally at another unfortunate class of men-the
poor."'24  The limitation was adopted by a vote of 18 to 17.25 Elam
Brown was "not surprised at the excitement this question has made"
19. Id. at 225.
20. CROSBY MEMOmS, supra note 3, at 44.
21. In seeming explanation of why he did not argue his views on the Conven-
tion floor, Crosby added: "There was a great deal of work done outside the Convention
perhaps more by consultations outside than by public debate. The time was so short
most of the determinations were made by discussions in Committees and interviews
outside of the public sittings and debates. In looking through the debates you see
how short and meagre they are. A great many of the men most active and influential
in the making of the Constitution hardly appeared as debaters on the floor." Id. at 45.
For "conditions and events and ideas ...which produced our system of electing
judges and limiting their tenure to terms of years," see Haynes, The Selection and
Tenure of Judges in THE DEMOcRATXc REVOLUnON IN AMERICA 1830-1850, ch. 4 (1944).
The California Convention was held at the time "the swing toward the democratiza-
tion of government" was at its height.
22. BRowNE DEBATES, supra note 9, at 225.
23. Id. at 226.
24. Id. at 227.
25. Id. at 231.
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because one class of delegates is "going to be deprived of very important
employment," obviously referring to the lawyer members of the conven-
tion.26 This remark caused more excitement.
Interpretation of the $200 limitation was involved in a case which
came before the California Supreme Court in 1858.27 Speaking for the
court, Justice Stephen J. Field stated:
As we read the section, the Court possesses appellate jurisdiction
in all cases; provided, that when the subject of litigation is capable
of pecuniary computation, the matter in dispute must exceed in
value or amount two hundred dollars, unless a question of the
legality of a tax, toll, impost, or municipal fine is drawn in ques-
tion. . . The sixth section of the same article declares that
"the District Courts shall have original jurisdiction, in law and
equity, in all civil cases, when the amount in dispute exceeds two
hundred dollars, exclusive of interest."
It could never have been the intention of the framers of the
Constitution to deny to the higher Courts, both original and ap-
pellate, any jurisdiction in that large class of cases where the relief
sought is not susceptible of pecuniary estimation-such as suits to
prevent threatened injury-respecting the guardianship of chil-
dren-honorary offices, to which no salary is attached, and the
like. 2
8
Another matter discussed at length on the convention floor was a
provision proposed by Pacifus Ord that judges should not charge
juries with respect to matters of fact, but may state the testimony and
declare the law. 9 Mr. Ord stated that the proposed section had been
taken from the Constitution of Tennessee. W.M. Gwin, a native of
Tennessee, reported how the section got into the constitution of that
state: "It originated from the acts of two of the judges. They were
impeached on the very charge of having abused the power of making
charges to the jury. The case involved the State in great expense, and
caused excitement throughout the country."30  C.T. Betts did not think
the custom of charging juries with respect to matters of fact should be
preserved simply because it was old.3  W.S. Sherwood agreed.32 K.H.
Dimmick, however, was opposed to introducing into the constitution
sections which were "more properly matters of legislative action."33
Nevertheless, the provision was adopted.
3 4
26. Id.
27. Conant v. Conant, 10 Cal. 249 (1858).
28. Id. at 253.
29. BROWNE DEBATES, supra note 9, at 234-39.
30. Id. at 235.
31. Id. at 236.
32. Id. at 237.
33. Id. at 239.
34. Id.
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The section of the constitution which authorized the Legislature
to establish "Tribunals for conciliation" was adopted without debate. 5
In Seventy-five years of California Jurisprudence,36 Orrin K. McMurray
wrote:
The Constitution of 1849, if one can judge from comparing it with
the State constitutions contained in a manual published in 1846 for
the use of the constitutional convention added scarcely any new
ideas to the stock of constitutional law. It is surprisingly similar in
many respects to the constitutions of Texas adopted in 1845 and
those of Iowa and New York adopted in 1846. One might think
that he detected the Spanish-Mexican influence in section 13 of
Article VI: "Tribunals for conciliation may be established, with
such powers and duties as may be prescribed by law; but such
tribunals shall have no power to render judgment to be obligatory
on the parties, except they voluntarily submit their matters in dif-
ference, and agree to abide the judgment, or assent thereto in the
presence of such tribunal, in such cases as shall be prescribed by
law." But the article is taken verbatim from the New York Con-
stitution of 1846 Article VI, section 23. The spirit of the common
law has ever been so strongly in favor of a contentious system of
procedure that the seed fell on barren ground. In Von Schmidt v.
Huntington [1 Cal. 55 (1850)], Justice Bennett gives some ac-
count of the Spanish-Mexican proceedings in conciliation. But ap-
parently it was the New York example, not the existing Spanish-
Mexican system which was responsible for the section in the con-
stitution of 1849.3
7
The case referred to by Professor McMurray was an appeal in 1850
from a decree of the Court of First Instance of the District of San
Francisco. This court had been established under Mexican law, and
was supposed to follow Mexican procedure. In that case, the court had
proceeded to trial without requiring a certificate showing that concilia-
tion had been attempted. The California Supreme Court held that
conciliation had been a necessary prerequisite to suit under Mexican
law, but its omission was not error. Justice Bennett stated:
[S]ince the acquisition of California by the Americans, the pro-
ceeding of conciliacion has, in all cases, been deemed a useless
formality by the greater portion of the members of the bar, by the
Courts and by the people;. . . it has, in fact, passed into disuse and
become obsolete. ...
. . . Notwithstanding the importance which seems to be at-
tached to the trial of conciliacion by Spanish and Mexican writers
(see 5 Tapia Feb. 209, and 1 Prac. For. Meg. 72, et seq. by Pefia
y Pefia), and even conceding that it may operate beneficially in the
nations for which it was originally designed, still amongst the
American people it can be looked upon in no other light than a use-
35. Id. at 234.
36. 13 CALKS. L. REv. 445 (1925).
37. Id. at 453.
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less and dilatory formality, unattended by a single profitable re-
sult, and not affecting the substantial justice of any case. 38
This being the attitude of the Americans in California at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution of 1849, it seems unlikely that the mere
fact that New York had authorized tribunals of conciliation would have
induced the American members of the California Convention to do like-
wise. More probably, the inclusion of the provision was in deference
to the feelings of the members of the convention who had lived in Cali-
fornia prior to the Occupation. 39  Although provided for by the New
York Code Commissioners in their report published in 1850,40 which
became the source of California's Code of Civil Procedure,41 tribunals
of conciliation were not established by the Legislature in the State of
California.
Another matter not discussed on the floor of the convention of
1849 was the change in the authority of the Supreme Court to issue
writs. The article on the judicial department as originally drafted pro-
vided that the Supreme Court should have power to issue "all writs
and processes necessary to do justice to parties" and to "exercise a su-
pervisory control" over "all inferior tribunals. 42  The article adopted
provided that the Supreme Court should have power to issue writs of
habeas corpus, and "all other writs and processes necessary to the ex-
ercise of their appellate jurisdiction. '43  The Supreme Court as orig-
inally proposed was a unified court having both trial and appellate
divisions; the Supreme Court as established was an appellate court. 44
In a case decided in June 185045 Chief Justice Hastings interpreted the
adopted article and denied that the Supreme Court should be consid-
38. Von Schmidt v. Huntington, I Cal. 55, 64-65 (1850).
39. Some members of the Convention had lived in California all their lives
(toda la vida); others, for long periods of time up to 20 years. Most of the pre-
Occupation delegates had Spanish names. BROWNE DEBATES, supra note 9, at 478-79.
40. THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK §§ 180-81, &
§§ 1523-42, at 641-47 (1850) ("reported complete" by the Commissioners on Practice
and Pleadings) [hereinafter cited as NEW YoRK DRAFT CODE]. In a note preceding
section 1523, at 641, the New York Code Commissioners stated: "This title is the
same as that reported by us, in our third report. The provisions are few and simple;
but they appear to us sufficient for the purpose. In the French code of civil pro-
cedure, eleven sections only are devoted to the proceedings in conciliation; and that
they are not found defective in details is proved by the fact, that in a single year
726,556 cases were settled in that way."
41. Blume, Adoption in California of the Field Code of Civil Procedure: A
Chapter in American Legal History, 17 HASTINGS L.J. 701 (1966).
42. BROWNE DEBATES, supra note 9, at 212.
43. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 4 (1849).
44. BROWNE DEBATES, supra note 9, at 212-13.
45. People ex rel. Attorney-General, ex parte, 1 Cal. 85 (1850).
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ered as having the same relation to the people as the English Court of
King's Bench. He recognized that the Supreme Court could exercise
a "supervisory control" over the inferior courts of the State, but the
"only original jurisdiction conferred either by the act of the Legislature
or the constitution, is in the isolated case of issuing writs of habeas
corpus."
46
11L Acts of the First Legislature: 1850
The Constitution of 1849 left to the Legislature the determination
of the number of justices of the peace "to be elected in each county,
city, town, and incorporated village of the State," and the fixing of
their "powers, duties, and responsibilities. '47  The Legislature was au-
thorized, but not required, to establish tribunals for conciliation and
"such municipal and other inferior courts as may be deemed neces-
sary.' '94 8
To discover how the First Legislature exercised its power to estab-
lish municipal courts, it is necessary to examine the general "ACT to
provide for the incorporation of cities" passed March 11, 1850,11 and
each of the special acts which incorporated particular cities. The gen-
eral act provided for the election of a mayor, recorder, city marshal,
city attorney, and other municipal officers. It further provided that
the recorder, "as to offenses committed within the city," should have
the examining and committing powers of a justice of the peace and
"jurisdiction over all violations of the City Ordinance."50  Similar
grants of jurisdiction had been included in the previously enacted special
act for the incorporation of Sacramento.51 In the act which incorpo-
rated Benicia, passed March 27, 1850,52 the mayor was given exclusive
46. The Act of the Legislature referred to by Chief Justice Hastings was "AN
ACT to organize the Supreme Court of California" passed February 14, 1850, which
provided that "said Court, and each of the Justices thereof, shall have power to issue
writs of Habeas Corpus, of Mandamus, of Injunction, Certiorari, Supersedeas, and
such other writs and processes known to the law, and may be necessary in the exercise
of their jurisdiction .... " Cal. Stat. 1850, ch. 14, § 7, at 57. "AN ACT to organize
the District Courts of the State of California" passed March 16, 1850, provided that
these courts should have power "to issue and direct writs of mandamus, prohibition,
quo warranto, habeas corpus, ne exeat, and all other writs and processes to courts
of inferior jurisdiction, and to corporations and individuals which shall be necessary to
the furtherance of justice and the regular executions of the laws; . . ." Id. ch. 33, § 8,
at 93.
47. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 14 (1849).
48. Id. §§ 1, 13.
49. Cal. Stat. 1850, ch. 30, at 87.
50. Id. ch. 30, §§ 23-24, at 90.
51. Id. ch. 20, at 71.
52. Id. ch. 45, at 119.
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jurisdiction "of all violations" of city ordinances, and "all the powers of
a Justice of the peace." In the other special acts, incorporating the
cities of San Diego,53 San Jose, 54 Monterey,55 Sonoma,5 6 Los Angeles,57
Santa Barbara,58 and San Francisco,5" the powers conferred on the
recorder by the general act were conferred on the recorder if one were
provided; otherwise, they were conferred on the mayor.
To complete the judicial system established by the constitution,
the Legislature from time to time, between February 2 and April 22,
1850, passed a number of separate acts." Nevertheless, in a report to the
Senate dated February 27, 1850,61 the Senate Committee on the Ju-
diciary rejected proposals to codify all the law as "impractical and
absurd," saying:
The most, therefore, that can be expected from the present Legis-
lature is, to set the machinery of government in operation in all
its departments, establish a system of pleadings and practice, en-
act certain statutes providing for the most common cases of judicial
investigation; and for the rest, resort to one of the two great reposi-
tories of legal learning, the Common or the Civil Law.62
IV. Court Act of 1851
"AN ACT concerning Courts of Justice of this State, and Judicial
Officers" was passed by the Second Session of the California Legislature
53. Id. ch. 46, at 121.
54. Id. ch. 47, at 127.
55. Id. ch. 50, at 131.
56. Id. ch. 56, at 150.
57. Id. ch. 60, at 155.
58. Id. ch. 68, at 172.
59. Id. ch. 98, at 223.
60. Cal. Stat. 1850, ch. 11, at 55 (concerning the office of Attorney General);
ch. 14, at 57 (to organize the Supreme Court); ch. 23, at 77 (to supersede certain
courts); ch. 33, at 93 (to organize the district courts); ch. 39, at 112 (concerning the
office of county attorney); ch. 40, at 112 (concerning the office of district attorney);
ch. 63, at 159 (to establish a municipal court in the City of San Francisco to be called
the superior court); ch. 73, at 179 (to regulate proceedings in justices' courts in civil
cases); ch. 84, at 203 (to regulate proceedings in county court); ch. 86, at 210 (to or-
ganize the court of sessions); ch. 90, at 216 (concerning the office of reporter); ch.
92, at 217 (to organize the county courts); ch. 105, at 257 (to fix the terms of the
Superior Court of San Francisco); ch. 106, at 258 (to prescribe the duties of sheriff);
ch. 110, at 261 (to define the duties of county clerk); ch. 112, at 263 (to prescribe
the duty of constable); ch. 142, at 428 (to regulate proceedings in civil cases in the
district court, Superior Court of San Francisco, and Supreme Court); ch. 129, at 377
(to regulate the settlement of the estates of deceased persons); ch. 119, at 275 (to
regulate proceedings in criminal cases); ch. 141, at 425 (concerning the forcible entry
and detainer).
61. Appendix to 1 Cal. at 588 (1851).
62. Id. at 591.
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on March 11, 1851.63 In his "Personal Reminiscences"' 4 Stephen J.
Field, after an account of his running for the Legislature, wrote:
Immediately after the election, I commenced the preparation
of a bill relating to the courts and judicial officers of the State, in-
tending to present it early in the session. The Legislature met at
San Jos6 on the first Monday of January 1851, and I was placed
on the Judiciary Committee of the House. My first business was to
call the attention of the Committee to the bill I had drawn. It met
their approval, was reported with a favorable recommendation,
and after a full discussion was passed. Its principal provisions re-
mained in force for many years, and most of them are retained in
the Code, which went into effect in January 1873.65
On the day the California Court Act of 1851 was passed66 another
act amending it was passed.67  The following is an outline of the judi-
cial system established by these acts:
COURTS OF JUSTICE
Supreme Court-to consist of a Chief Justice and two associ-
ate justices.
District Courts-to be held by one judge in each of 11 judi-
cial districts.
Superior Court of San Francisco-to be composed of three
judges until next election; afterwards, one judge.
County Courts-to be held in each county by the county
judge.
Courts of Sessions-to be held by the county judge and two
justices of the peace.
63. Cal. Stat. 1851, ch. 1, at 2.
64. S. FIELD, CALIFOrNrA ALCALDE app., at 153 (1950).
65. While running for the Legislature, Field stated publicly that his "object in
wishing to go to the Legislature was to reform the judiciary, and among other things, to
remove [Judge Turner] from the district." Id. at 45. Reviewing the results of his
legislative career Field stated: "I drew, as already stated, and carried through the
Legislature a bill defining the powers and jurisdiction of the courts and judicial officers
of the State; and whilst thus doing good, I also got rid of the ignorant and brutal judge
of our district who had outraged my rights, assaulted my character, and threatened
my life. I also, as I have mentioned, introduced bills regulating the procedure in
civil and criminal cases, remodeled with many changes from the Codes of Civil and
Criminal Procedure reported by the Commissioners of New York; and secured
their passage." Id. at 63. For accounts of Fields work as a legislator, see series of
articles published in the San Jose Daily Herald in 1879, reprinted in SOME AccoUNT OF
Tm WORK OF ST'EPHEN J. FmiLD, 3-14 (C. Black & S. Smith eds. 1881).
66. Cal. Stat. 1851, ch. 1, at 9.
67. Id. ch. 2, at 31.
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Probate Courts-to be held in each county by the county
judge as a probate judge.
Justices' Courts-to be held by justices of the peace.
Recorders' Courts-to be held, in cities where established, by
one judge designated recorder of the city.
Mayors' Court-mayors of cities having mayors' courts are
the judges of such courts.
JUDICIAL OFFICERS
Justices of the Supreme Court-to be elected by voters of the
State; to hold office for 6 years.
District Judges-to be elected by voters of their respective
districts; to hold office for 6 years; to be eligible, must be a
citizen of the United States, a resident of the State for 1
year, and a resident of the district for 6 months.
Judge of the Superior Court of San Francisco-to be elected
by voters of the city; to hold office for 3 years.
County Judge-to be elected by voters of the county; to hold
office for 4 years.
Associate Justices of the Court of Sessions-to be chosen by
the justices of the peace of the county.
Judge of the Probate Court-same as county judge.
Justices of the Peace-to be elected by voters of their re-
spective townships or cities; to hold office for 1 year.
Recorder of the City-to be elected by voters of the city; to
hold office for 1 year, unless a longer time is prescribed by
the act incorporating the city.
Judges of Mayors' Courts-selection of mayors and their
term of office not covered by the act.
OTHER OFFICERS
No provision, except the county clerk is to be the clerk of the
court of sessions.
SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION
Supreme Court-to have appellate jurisdiction in all cases
where the dispute exceeds $200, when the legality of a tax,
toll, impost, or municipal fine is in question, and questions of
[Vol. 22
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law in all criminal cases amounting to felony; may review on
appeal (1) judgments and intermediate orders involving
merits and necessarily affecting judgments of district courts
and of the Superior Court of San Francisco, and (2) orders
granting or refusing a new trial or affecting substantial
rights; may review proceedings of inferior tribunals, boards,
or officers on certiorari, and issue writs of mandate; the Su-
preme Court and each justice may issue other writs necessary
or proper to the complete exercise of constitutional and statu-
tory powers.
District Courts-to have original jurisdiction in all civil cases
where the amount in dispute exceeds $200, in criminal cases
not otherwise provided for, and in all issues of fact joined in
probate courts; jurisdiction is to be unlimited in cases involv-
ing title or possession of land, and in all issues of fact joined
in probate courts; may review on appeal (1) final judgments
and intermediate orders involving merits and necessarily af-
fecting judgments in actions commenced in county courts,
(2) judgments of county courts in appealed cases involving
a tax, toll, impost, license, fine, or the possession of land,
(3) judgments of courts of session in criminal actions, (4)
orders of county courts and courts of session granting or re-
fusing a new trial or affecting a substantial right, and (5)
orders and judgments of probate courts in cases prescribed by
statute; may review proceedings of inferior tribunals, boards,
or officers on certiorari, and issue writs of mandate; the court
and judge may issue other writs necessary or proper to the
complete exercise of constitutional and statutory powers.
Superior Court of San Francisco-to have jurisdiction coex-
tensive with the district court in like cases, in all civil cases
where the amount in dispute exceeds $200 or which involve
title or possession of land in San Francisco; may review pro-
ceedings of inferior tribunals, boards, or officers on certi-
orari, and issue writs of mandate; court and judge (or judges
until next election) may issue other writs necessary or proper
to the complete exercise of constitutional and statutory pow-
ers.
County Courts-may review on appeal judgments rendered
in civil actions or proceedings by justices' court or recorders'
courts within the county; to have original jurisdiction (1) to
enforce mechanics' and other liens, (2) to prevent or abate
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a nuisance, (3) to prevent waste or give damages therefor,
and (4) in cases, of insolvency; may review proceedings of
inferior tribunals or offices on certiorari, and issue writs of
mandate; court and judge may issue other writs necessary or
proper to the complete exercise of constitutional and statutory
powers.
Court of Sessions-to have jurisdiction (1) to inquire by
grand jury into public offenses committed or triable in the
county; (2) to try grand jury indictments except murder,
manslaughter, and arson, and to try these when the indict-
ment is against a district judge; (3) to hear and to determine
appeals from justices', recorders', and mayors' courts in
criminal cases; may issue and make all writs and orders neces-
sary for the complete exercise of powers.
Probate Court-to have exclusive jurisdiction, in the first
instance, to take proof of wills in six specified situations;68
may (1) grant and revoke letters testamentary and of ad-
ministration, (2) control conduct and accounts of executors
and administrators, (3) enforce payment of debts and lega-
cies, and distribution of estates, (4) order sale and disposal
of real property of deceased persons, and (5) take care and
custody of the person and estate of infants residing in the
county, and of persons incapable of caring for themselves or
their property; may appoint and remove guardians, direct and
control their conduct, and settle their accounts; may issue and
make all writs and orders necessary for the complete exercise
of its powers.
Justices' Courts-to have jurisdiction of actions and proceed-
ings not exceeding $500 ($200 in San Francisco and Sacra-
mento Counties) in actions or proceedings involving (1) con-
tracts for money only, (2) damages to persons or personal
68. Id. ch. 1, §§ 80-81, at 21-22. The six specified situations are: (1) When
the testator, at or immediately before his death, was an inhabitant of the county, in
whatever place he may have died; (2) when the testator, not being an inhabitant of
this State, shall have died in the county, leaving assets therein; (3) when the testator,
not being an inhabitant of this State, shall have died out of the State, leaving assets in
the county; (4) when the testator, not being an inhabitant of this State, shall have
died out of the State, not leaving assets therein, but where assets thereafter come
into the county; (5) where real property, devised by the testator, is situated in the
county, and no other probate court has gained jurisdiction, under any of the four
preceding situations; and (6) when the testator shall have died out of this State, not
being an inhabitant thereof, and not leaving assets therein, shall leave a will rela-
tive to real property situated in the county.
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property, (3) fines, penalties, and forfeitures, (4) money
bonds, (5) surety bonds taken by justices' courts (amount
unlimited); (6) enforcements of mortgages and liens on per-
sonal property, (7) possession of personal property, (8) con-
fessed judgments, and (9) forcible entry and detainer
(amount unlimited); not to have jurisdiction (1) where title
to real property comes into question, (2) to enforce mort-
gages and liens on real property, nor (3) of actions against
executors and administrators; to have jurisdiction to try with
a jury of 12 (or less, if agreed to) the right to "mining
claims" within their respective cities or townships; to have
jurisdiction (except in the cities of San Francisco, Sacra-
mento, and Stockton) of (1) petit larceny, (2) assault and
battery, except on a public officer or with intent to kill, and
(3) breaches of the peace, riots, affrays, willful injury to
property, and all misdemeanors punishable by fine not ex-
ceeding $500 or imprisonment not exceeding 3 months.
Recorders' Courts-to have jurisdiction of actions and pro-
ceedings (1) for violation of any city ordinance, (2) to pre-
vent or to abate nuisance within city limits, and (3) respect-
ing vagrants and disorderly persons; to have jurisdiction of
certain offenses committed within the city including (1) petit
larceny, (2) assault and battery, except on a public officer
or with intent to kill, (3) breaches of the peace, riots, af-
frays, willful injury to property, and all misdemeanors where
the fine does not exceed $500 or imprisonment in excess of
3 months; may exercise powers and duties of committing
magistrates in criminal cases not within their jurisdiction; may
issue and make all writs and orders necessary for the com-
plete exercise of their powers.
Mayors' Courts-to have the same jurisdiction of actions and
public offenses committed in their respective cities as is con-
ferred by this act on recorders' courts; may exercise the same
powers as committing magistrates as are conferred on re-
corders by this act; may issue and make all writs and orders
necessary for the complete exercise of their powers.
VENUE AND RANGE OF PROCESS
No provisions.
The Court Act of 1851 specified the jurisdiction of justices' courts,
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recorders' courts, and mayors' courts. But to know which of these
courts, if any, was established in a particular city, it is necessary to
examine the special acts incorporating particular cities and all acts
amending them. 69 These special acts not only specified the type of
court to be established, but, in practically all instances, prescribed its
jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of these courts, therefore, might or might
not be the same as set out in the Court Act of 1851. The Mayor's
Court of Monterey, in addition to the criminal jurisdiction usually con-
ferred, was given jurisdiction within the city of "civil actions to the
same extent as Justices of the Peace."7  Recorders' courts in the cities
of Nevada 7' and Sonora72 were given jurisdiction of actions to deter-
mine the right to "mining claims" within the city.
Jurisdiction to determine the right to "mining claims" conferred
on justices of the peace by the Court Act of 185173 was given in these
words:
These Courts shall also have jurisdiction; 1st, To try with a jury
of twelve men, or with a jury of a less number if the parties
agree thereto, the right of "mining claims," within their respective
cities or townships.
It does not appear that this jurisdiction was limited in amount. Section
621 of Field's Civil Practice Act of 1851 provided:
74
In actions respecting "Mining Claims," proof shall be admitted
of the customs, usages, or regulations established and in force at
the bar, or diggings, embracing such claim; and such customs,
usages, or regulations, when not in conflict with the Constitution
and Laws of this State, shall govern the decision of the action.
The significance of this provision in the development of American min-
ing and water law has been often noted.75
A court not included in the Court Act of 1851 was established
by "AN ACT concerning Judges of the Plains (Jueces del Campo),
and defining their duties" passed April 25, 1851.76 These judges were
69. Id. ch. 78, at 329 (Los Angeles); ch. 80, at 330 (Marysville); ch. 82, at 339
(Nevada); ch. 83, at 348 (Benecia); ch. 84, at 357 (San Francisco); ch. 85, at 367
(Monterey); ch. 86, at 375 (Sonora); and ch. 89, at 391 (Sacramento).
70. Id. ch. 85, art. V, § 2, at 373.
71. Id. ch. 82, art. V, § 2, at 347.
72. Id. ch. 86, art. V, § 2, at 382.
73. Id. ch. 1, § 89, at 23.
74. Id. ch. 4, tit. XVI, ch. V, § 621, at 149.
75. See the comments by Professor Pomeroy in his Introduction to SOME Ac-
COUNT OF THE WORK OF STEPHEN J. FIELD, supra note 65, at 17-19, and the article at 5,
reprinted from the San Jose Daily Herald of November 18, 1879. Also see Field's
opinion in Jennison v. Kirk, 98 U.S. 453, 462 (1878).
76. Cal. Stat. 1851, ch. 131, at 515.
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to be appointed by courts of sessions for terms of 1 year. They were
charged with the duty of attending "all rodeos or gathering of cattle"
to decide disputes respecting "ownership, mark, or brand." Appeal to
a justice of the peace was authorized. The judge of the plains was di-
rected to arrest and take before a magistrate all persons accused of
"killing, hiding, or otherwise taking away animals belonging to others."
V. Court Act as Revised in 1853
The Court Act of 1851 was repealed, and a new act with the
same title was passed and approved May 19, 1853.1 After referring
to Stephen J. Field's work in drafting the Court Act of 1851, a writer
in the San Josi Daily Herald of December 26, 1879, added "that the
Act of 1853 with the same title-which was the original act carefully
revised, and introduced into the Legislature by Mr. Samuel B. Smith
of Sutter County-was also prepared by him [Field]."'78  Field, at this
time, was not a member of the Legislature.
The act of 1853 contained the same chapters as the act of 1851,
but fewer sections. It provided for the same courts and judicial officers,
and made only minor changes in jurisdiction. Nonjudicial officers
were not included. The general scheme of the judicial system remained
the same.
VI. Constitution of 1849 as Amended in 1862
A revision of article VI of the Constitution of 1849--"Judicial
Department"-was proposed in 1861; it was ratified September 3,
1862.79 The revised article provided that the "Judicial power of this
State shall be vested in a Supreme Court, in District Courts, in County
Courts, in Probate Courts, and in Justices of the Peace and in such Re-
corders' and other inferior Courts as the Legislature may establish in
any incorporated city or town. '8 0  The authority given by the original
article VI to establish tribunals for conciliation and its provision for
courts of sessions were omitted. After directing the Legislature to pro-
vide for the election of clerks and other nonjudicial officers, revised
article VI authorized the Legislature to provide "for the appointment
by the several District Courts of one or more Commissioners in the sev-
eral counties of their respective Districts, with authority to perform
77. Cal. Stat. 1853, ch. 180, at 287.
78. "Samuel B. Smith" is the name of one of the editors of SOME ACCOUNT OF
THE WORK OF STEPHEN J. FIELD (1881) in which the newspaper article was reprinted
at 11-13.
79. CAL. CONST. art. VI (1862).
80. Id. art. VI, § 6 (1862).
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chamber business of the Judges of the District Courts and County
Courts, and also to take depositions and to perform such other busi-
ness connected with the administration of justice as may be prescribed
by law.""' The Legislature was directed to "determine the number
of Justices of the Peace to be elected in each city and township of the
State, and fix by law their powers, duties, and responsibilities.
8s2 It
was also directed to fix by law "the jurisdiction of any Recorder's or
other inferior municipal Court which may be established." 3  The re-
vised article further provided that the Supreme Court should consist of
a Chief Justice and four (instead of two) associate justices who should
hold office for 10 years (instead of 6). Jurisdiction was prescribed as
follows:
The Supreme court shall have appellate jurisdiction in all cases
in equity; also, in all cases at law which involve the title or posses-
sion of real estate, or the legality of any tax, impost, assessment,
toll, or municipal fine, or in which the demand, exclusive of in-
terest, or the value of the property in controversy, amounts to
three hundred dollars; also, in all cases arising in the Probate
Courts; and also, in all criminal cases amounting to felony, on
questions of law alone. The court shall also have power to issue
writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, and habeas corpus,
and also, all writs necessary or proper to the complete exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction.
84
The wording of the revised article indicates that the Supreme Court
was to have both "appellate" and "original" jurisdiction, the latter to be
exercised through the writs listed in the article. Article VI, as originally
adopted, had been interpreted as conferring on the Supreme Court, be-
sides habeas corpus powers, only appellate jurisdiction. 5 The Cali-
fornia Code Commissioners of 1871, in a note accompanying their
draft of the Code of Civil Procedure, stated: 8 6
We have not used the phrases "cases in equity," "cases at law,"
and it is a little singular, to say the least, that these phrases were
inserted in the constitution more than ten years after the adoption
of our practice act, the very first section of which declared that
there should be one form of civil action, obliterating at once the
81. Id. § 11 (1862).
82. Id. § 9 (1862).
83. Id. § 10 (1862).
84. Id. § 4 (1862).
85. See text accompanying note 15 supra. Part I of the Code of Civil Procedure
proposed in 1871 states that the court's jurisdiction is of two kinds: "original" and
"appellate." 3 REVISED LAWS OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA IN FOUR CODES: POLITICAL,
CIVIL, CIVIL PROCEDURE AND PENAL-CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE pt. I, tit. I, ch. 11, § 42
(1871) [hereinafter cited as PROPOSED CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE OF 1871].
86. PROPOSED CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE OF 1871, supra note 85, pt I, tit. I,
ch. II, § 44.
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distinctions between actions at law and suits in equity.8 7
The commissioners stated that they had experienced "no little dif-
ficulty" in framing a section that would "clearly define the appellate
jurisdiction of the supreme court," observing that "to have simply fol-
lowed the terms of the constitution in defining the jurisdiction, would
have conveyed to one not familiar with the construction placed upon
those terms by our court of last resort, but a faint idea of the extent
or limit of that jurisdiction."" The section framed by the commis-
sioners"9 reads:
Sec. 44. Its appellate jurisdiction extends-
1. To all civil actions for relief formerly given in courts of
equity.
2. To all civil actions in which the subject of litigation is not
capable of pecuniary compensation.
3. To all civil actions in which the subject of litigation is
capable of pecuniary compensation, which involves the title of
possession of real estate, or the legality of any tax, impost, assess-
ment, toll or municipal fine, or in which the demand, exclusive of
interest, or the value of the property in controversy, amounts to
three hundred dollars.
4. To all special proceedings,
5. To all cases arising in the probate courts; and,
6. To all criminal actions amounting to a felony, on ques-
tions of law alone.
In support of their statement of the extent of the Supreme Court's
jurisdiction, the commissioners quoted at length from the opinion writ-
ten in 1858 by Justice Field in Conant v. Conant" and from the
opinion written in 1866 by Chief Justice Currey in Knowles v. Yates.91
In the latter opinion the Chief Justice, after referring to Conant v.
Conant, stated:
The highest courts of original jurisdiction have been in the
practice, from the beginning, of taking cognizance of cases in which
the subject-matter was not susceptible of pecuniary estimation,
and concerning which no mention in terms was made in the Con-
stitution. Cases of divorce are in this class, as also suits to pre-
vent threatened injuries, respecting the guardianship of children,
87. Stephen J. Field, in drafting his Court Act of 1851, omitted the words "in
law and equity" which had been employed by the Constitution of 1849. Compare
Cal. Stat. 1851, ch. 131, §§ 5-8, at 10, with CAr.. CoNsT. art. VI, § 4 (1849).
88. PROPOSED CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE OF 1871, supra note 85, pt. I, tit. I,
ch. II, § 42.
89. Id. § 44.
90. 10 Cal. 249 (1858). The statement concerning jurisdiction is quoted in text
accompanying note 27 supra.
91. 31 Cal. 83 (1866).
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honorary offices, and proceedings in the nature of writs of quo
warranto; and in all such cases the Supreme Court, throughout the
same period, entertained and exercised appellate jurisdiction.
92
Article VI of the Constitution of 1849, as amended in 1862, pro-
vided that the district courts should have
original jurisdiction in all cases in equity; also, in all cases at law
which involve title or possession of real property, or the legality
of any tax, impost, assessment, toll, or municipal fine, and in all
other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, or the value
of the property in controversy, amounts to three hundred dollars;
and also in all criminal cases not otherwise provided for.
In their attempt to codify the extent of the jurisdiction of the district
courts, the California Code Commissioners of 1871 were "met", ac-
cording to their report, "with the same difficulties that were encoun-
tered in drafting the section relative to the appellate jurisdiction of the
supreme court. . . . The truth is, that the amendments of 1862, in
so far as they attempt to fix and define the jurisdiction of the several
courts of record, were so framed that to have given their terms any
fair or reasonable construction, would have emasculated our whole judi-
cial system." 93  The section framed by the commissioners" reads:
Sec. 57. The jurisdiction of the district courts extends-
1. To all civil actions for relief formerly given in courts of
equity.
2. To all civil actions in which the subject of litigation is not
capable of pecuniary compensation.
3. To all civil actions (except actions of forcible entry and
detainer) in which the subject of litigation is capable of pecuniary
compensation, which involves the title or possession of real estate
or the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, toll, or municipal
fine, or in which the demand, exclusive of interest, or the value
of the property in controversy, amount [sic] to three hundred
dollars.
4. To all special proceedings not within the jurisdiction of
the county court, as defined in this code.
5. To the issuance of writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibi-
92. Id. at 89.
93. PROPOSED CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE OF 1871, supra note 85, pt. I, tit. I,
ch. IV, § 57. The commissioners referred to the following statement made by Justice
Rhodes in Courtwright v. Bear River & Auburn Water & Mining Co., 30 Cal. 573, 578
(1866): "It is a matter of some doubt whether that Article [Article VI before
amendment] deserved the commendation of having been drawn with great skill . . .; but
there is less question that the same cannot be said of the Article as it now stands."
The commissioners referred, also, to Perry v. Ames, 26 Cal. 372 (1864). In this case
Currey, J., pointed out that under Article VI of the Constitution of 1849, both before
and after amendment, the District Courts had original jurisdiction to issue writs of
mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, and habeas corpus. Id. at 383.
94. PROPOSED CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 85, pt. I, tit. I, ch. IV, § 57.
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tion, habeas corpus, and all writs necessary to the exercise of its
powers.
6. To the trial of all indictments for treason, misprision of
treason, murder and manslaughter.
The jurisdiction of only one other court was fixed by the Constitu-
tion of 1849. Article VI, as amended in 1862, provided:
The county courts shall have original jurisdiction of actions of
forcible entry and detainer, of proceedings in insolvency, of actions
to prevent or abate a nuisance, and of all such special cases and
proceedings as are not otherwise provided for; and also, such
criminal jurisdiction as the legislature may prescribe; they shall also
have appellate jurisdiction in all cases arising in courts held by
justices of the peace and recorders, and in such inferior courts as
may be established, in pursuance of section one of this article, in
their respective counties. The county judges shall also hold in
their several counties probate courts, and perform such duties as
probate judges as may be prescribed by law.
The extent of the county court's jurisdiction in criminal cases, and the
duties of probate judges-matters left to the Legislature-will be found
in the Court Act of 1863,15 referred to next below. The California
Code Commissioners of 1871 added a provision extending the juris-
diction of the county courts to the issuance of writs of mandamus,
certiorari, and prohibition.96
VIIL Court Act as Revised in 1863
The 1862 revision of article VI of the Constitution of 1849 made
necessary a revision of the Court Act of 1853. The earlier act was
therefore repealed, and a new act with the same title and arrangement
was passed; it was approved April 20, 1863. 97  This act, like the prior
acts, was limited to "Courts of Justice" and "Judicial Officers." Non-
judicial officers were not included. The act listed as the courts of the
State: (1) The Supreme Court; (2) the district courts; (3) the county
courts; (4) the probate courts; (5) the recorders' and other inferior
municipal courts. 98 In a new chapter,99 provision was made for court
commissioners, one to be appointed in each county (or each part of
divided counties). The specific duties of these officers were set out in
the act. 100 In the sections of the act which stated the jurisdiction of
95. Cal. Stat. 1863, ch. 260, at 333.,
96. PROPOSED CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE OF 1871, supra note 85, pt. I, tit. I,
ch. V, § 84.
97. Cal. Stat. 1863, ch. 260, at 333.
98. Id. ch. I, § 1, at 333.
99. Id. ch. V, § 39, at 338.
100. Id. ch. V, § 40, at 338.
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the Supreme Court and of the district courts, there was no attempt at
codification, but merely re-use of the terms of the constitution. Two
courts included in the Court Acts of 1851 and 1853 disappeared:
the Superior Court for the City of San Francisco 1 and the court of
sessions. 101
With reference to the probate courts authorized by the Constitu-
tion of 1849, Justice Heydenfeldt, speaking for the California Supreme
Court in 1855, declared: "The Probate Court is a Court of special and
limited jurisdiction. Most of its general powers belong peculiarly and
originally to the Court of Chancery, which still retains all its jurisdic-
tion."'1 3  The constitution had provided that the district courts should
have unlimited jurisdiction "in all issues of fact joined in the probate
courts."'01 4  This provision was omitted when the constitution was
amended in 1862. Referring to this omission Justice Rhodes stated in
1868:
The omission is very significant, and can be accounted for in
no other way than upon the theory that it was not intended that the
District Courts should possess such jurisdiction. Section eight of
the same Article, relating to the County Courts, provides that "the
County Judges shall also hold in their several counties Probate
Courts, and perform such other duties as Probate Judges as may
be prescribed by law." This is a comprehensive grant of probate
jurisdiction, and as there is nothing in the Article granting concur-
rent jurisdiction, the grant to the Probate Courts must be held exclu-
sive. There may be cases involving matters peculiar to Probate
Courts of which the District Courts may have jurisdiction; but
matters like the probate of a will, the granting of letters testamen-
tary or of administration, the allowance of claims, the settlement
of accounts of the executor or administrator, etc., were well under-
stood at the time of the adoption of the amendments to the Con-
stitution as falling within the probate section. 10 5
VI. Code of Civil Procedure: 1872
"AN ACT to establish a Code of Civil Procedure" was approved
March 11, 1872."06 The code was divided into four parts:
101. This court was abolished by the Legislature in 1857. Cal. Stat. 1857, ch. 117,
at 128; Ames, The Origin and Jurisdiction of the Municipal Courts in California, 21
CALiw. L. REv. 117, 119 (1933).
102. This court was abolished by being omitted from article VI of the Constitution
of 1849 as amended in 1862. Concerning the time of its demise, see In re Oliverez,
21 Cal. 415, 417-18 (1863).
103. Clark v. Perry, 5 Cal. 59 (1855), quoted in, Deck v. Gerke, 12 Cal. 433
(1859). See note following report of Clark v. Perry.
104. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (1849).
105. In re Will of Bowen, 34 Cal. 682 (1868).
106. This act was not printed in the 1871-1872 statutes. A copy of the act
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I. Of Courts of Justice
11. Of Civil Actions
III. Of Special Proceedings of a Civil Nature
IV. Of Evidence
Part I was made up of five titles:
I. Of their organization, jurisdiction and terms
U1. Of judicial officers
I. Of persons specially invested with powers of a judicial na-
ture
IV. Of the ministerial officers of the courts of justice
V. Of persons specially invested with ministerial powers re-
lating to courts of justice
The headings of the parts and titles of the code as adopted were
exactly the same as in the code proposed by the California commis-
sioners in 1871.107 Further, except for two minor additions, they read
exactly the same as in the proposed draft of the New York Code of
Civil Procedure0 8 which was "reported complete" by the New York
commissioners in 1849 and printed in 1850.19 It is at once apparent
that titles III, IV, and V of part I of the California Code adopted in
1872 covered matters not included in the earlier California court acts,
and that the "complete" New York commissioners' draft code was the
pattern followed in framing the California Code.
Title I of part I of the California Code declared: "The following
are the Courts of Justice of this State:
1. The Court for the trial of impeachments;
2. The Supreme Court;
3. The District Courts;
4. The County Courts;
5. The Probate Courts;
6. The Municipal Criminal Court of San Francisco;
7. The Justices' Courts;
8. The Police Courts."
certified by the code commissioners was printed separately by the state printer in
1872. In their certificate the commissioners refer to the fact that the act was ap-
proved March 11, 1872.
107. PROPOSED COO OF CrvI PROCEDURE OF 1871, supra note 85, pts. I-IV.
108. NEW YORK DRAFT CODE, supra note 40, at x-xcv.
109. The two additions were "of a civil nature" added to the heading of part
III and "and Terms" added to the heading of title I of part I.
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The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and district courts is stated in
exactly the same language as in the proposed code printed in 1871, but
in stating the jurisdiction of the county courts slight changes in wording
were made. For instance, the courts were said to have power to issue
writs of "mandate" and "review" instead of writs of "mandamus" and
"certiorari."11  This was done in line with provisions of part I1 of
the code which changed the names of these writs from Latin to English
as was done in the proposed New York commissioners' draft code1 '
printed in 1850.
As noted above, 1 2 the California Code commissioners' draft code
of 1871 did not merely follow the terms of the amendment to the
constitution in stating the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and district
courts; rather, by a process of codification, it undertook to state their
jurisdiction more clearly by using constructions of terms that had
been previously interpreted by the Supreme Court. Also, in place of
the phrase "cases in equity" used in the constitution, the code commis-
sioners referred to "civil actions for relief formerly given in courts of
equity."" 3
According to a note to section 106 of the California commis-
sioners' draft code of 1871, the jurisdiction of the Municipal Court of
San Francisco was set out in section 796 of the Penal Code. This
court had been established by the Legislature in 1870."1
In a note to section 114, which specified the jurisdiction of the
justices' courts, the commissioners stated:
The preceding section is based upon the act of 1863 (Stat. 1863,
p. 340). . . . Subdivision 5 of the original section gave these
courts jurisdiction of actions of foreclosure when the debt secured
did not exceed three-hundred dollars, trenching upon the equity
jurisdiction cast by the constitution upon the district courts; there-
fore we have omitted this subdivision, and for kindred reasons we
have omitted the provisions of the eighth subdivision of the original
section, conferring jurisdiction upon justices' courts to determine
the right to a mining claim, when the value of the claim did not
exceed three hundred dollars.
California Code of Civil Procedure section 121, as officially printed
110. Compare PROPOSED CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE OF 1871, supra note 85, pt.
III, tit. I, ch. IV, § 1108, with NEW YORK DRAFT CODE, supra note 40, pt. II, tit. I,
ch. 2, 88 1271, 1282.
111. NEW YORK DRAFT CODE, supra note 40, pt. III, tit. I, ch. 2, § 1271, 1282.
112. See text accompanying notes 85-91 supra.
113. PROPOSED CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE OF 1871, supra note 85, pt. I, tit. I, ch.
III, § 44 & ch. IV, § 57.
114. Cal. Stat. 1870, ch. 384, § 1, at 528.
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in 1872, provided: "Police Courts are established in incorporated cities
and towns, and their organization, jurisdiction, and powers provided in
the POLITICAL CODE, Part IV." This reference was to sections
4426 and 4427 of the Political Code, which was approved March 12,
1872. The jurisdiction conferred was both criminal and civil; jurisdic-
tion of specified offenses "committed within the city boundaries" being
exclusive. Because of the distinction which existed between "charter"
municipal courts and "statutory" municipal coiurts" 5 it is necessary to
check the provisions of the city charters to determine just what police
and other municipal courts were in existence at any particular time.
Attention was called above to a note by the California Code com-
missioners explaining why they had not used the phrases "cases in
equity" and "cases at law" employed by the constitution.116 Similarly,
in a note to section 259 of their draft code of 1871, a section concerning
court commissioners, the California Code commissioners stated that
they had "purposely omitted 'commissioners in equity'." The New
York Code commissioners had carefully avoided the use of the terms
"law" and "equity" in stating the jurisdiction of the New York courts.117
IX. Summary and Comment
In a case before the Supreme Court of the United States in 1871,118
Chief Justice Chase, after a review of the acts of Congress which had
established the Territories of the United States, observed: "In 1836
the Territory of Wisconsin was organized under an act, which seems
to have received full consideration, and from which all subsequent acts
for the organization of Territories have been copied, with few and in-
considerable variations.""' 9 The Wisconsin Act provided: "That the
Judicial Power of the said Territory shall be vested in a Supreme Court,
district courts, probate courts, and in justices of the peace. The Su-
115. In re Carrillo, 66 Cal. 3 (1884).
116. See text accompanying note 86 supra.
117. In a note to section 42 of the New York commissioner's draft Code of Civil
Procedure, supra note 40, the New York commissioners called attention to the lan-
guage of the New York Constitution giving jurisdiction to the Supreme Court: "There
shall be a supreme court, having general jurisdiction in law and equity." N.Y. CONST.
art. VI, § 3 (1846). They also called attention to a statute providing that the Supreme
Court should have the powers and jurisdiction "exercised by the present supreme court
and court of chancery." Law of May 12, 1847, ch. 280, § 16, [1847] N. Y. Laws 323.
The code commissioners, in stating the jurisdiction of the court in' section 41, used
the phrases "civil actions" and "special proceedings" without reference to "law,"
"equity," or "chancery."
118. Clinton v. Englebrecht, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 434 (1871).
119. Id. at 661.
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preme Court shall consist of a chief justice and two associate judges,
any two of whom shall be a quorum."120 The judicial system estab-
lished in the Iowa Territory in 1838121 was the same as that of Wis-
consin, except the superior judges were to be appointed for a limited
term (4 years) instead of "during good behavior," and each was re-
quired to reside in his assigned district. The Wisconsin Act had pro-
vided for election by the people of "all township officers and all county
officers, except judicial officers, justices of the peace, sheriffs, and
clerks of courts." But by acts passed in 1839122 and 1843123 the legis-
latures of Iowa and Wisconsin were authorized to provide for "the elec-
tion or appointment of sheriffs, judges of probate, justices of the
peace." The Iowa court plan, as thus developed out of the carefully
considered Wisconsin plan, became the master plan of court organization
for the territories. And when states were formed from the seventeen
territories which had the master plan, their first constitutions established
court systems which were strikingly similar. 1
24
It can be seen at a glance that the plan of court organization set
out in California's first constitution was an adaptation of the master
plan developed for the territories. Article VI reads:
Sec. 1. The judicial power of this State shall be vested in a
Supreme Court, in District Courts, in County Courts, and in Jus-
tices of the Peace. The Legislature may also establish such munici-
pal and other inferior courts as may be deemed necessary.
Sec. 2. The Supreme Court shall consist of a Chief Justice
and two Associate Justices, any two of whom shall constitute a
quorum. 1
25
To adapt the territorial plan to state use it was necessary to find a
substitute for Presidential appointment of the superior judges, and to
eliminate jurisdiction which was exclusively federal. Election by the
people was then the obvious substitute for Presidential appointment,
and this was provided by the California Constitution.1 26  A major
question was whether to retain the territorial plan of having the same
superior judges sit separately as trial judges, and together as an appel-
late court. 127 The first draft of article VI of the California Constitution
120. Act of Apr. 20, 1836, ch. 54, § 9, 5 Stat. 13.
121. Act of June 12, 1838, ch. 96, § 9, 5 Stat. 235.
122. Act of Mar. 3, 1839, ch. 92, 5 Stat. 357.
123. Act of Mar. 3, 1843, ch. 96, 5 Stat. 630.
124. Blume & Brown, Territorial Courts and Law (Part I. Establishment of a
Standardized Judicial System), 61 MICH. L. REv. 103 (1962).
125. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (1849).
126. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 3.
127. See text accompanying note 14 supra.
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followed the territorial plan, but after debate in the convention, the
article was changed to provide for separate trial and appellate judges.
This was true of almost all the seventeen states formed from the terri-
tories having the master plan. 1 8  In six of these states separate probate
courts were established in accordance with the territorial plan; 2' in
another six, county courts having jurisdiction which included probate
were established.'3 0 In California this county court modification was
adopted. California, and all but two of the seventeen states provided
for justices of the peace; and all seventeen, including California, pro-
vided that other inferior courts might be established by legislative ac-
tion. Although, due to the rush of events, California missed becoming
a territory before becoming a state, it was created under frontier condi-
tions similar to those which existed in the territories; thus, it is not sur-
prising that it began with a distinctively American-frontier judicial
system.
1 31
128. Blume & Brown, supra note 124, at 103.
129. Id. at 104.
130. Id.
131. For a different view as to the source of the State's first judicial system, see
Mason, Constitutional History of California in CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
* * * CONSTrrUTION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 75 (California Legislature pub.
1969), where the author states: "The judicial system provided for the provinces of
Mexico corresponds very closely with the present judicial system of California; the
tribunal and courts of segunda instancia correspond with our Supreme and appellate
courts; the courts of primeria instancia, with our superior courts; the alcaldes courts,
with our municipal courts and the justices' courts with our own justices' courts. The
judicial system adopted by the first constitution was the system already established in
California under the laws of Mexico." Id. at 77. He further states: "The Judicial
Department, while very similar to that of other states, was a continuation of the Mexi-
can courts established by the law of 1837 with the one modification, that the Justices
of the Supreme Court did not sit separately as judges of the district courts as the cor-
responding judges had done under the Mexican system." Id. at 90. Referring to the
first constitution as a whole he states: "In arrangement, the Constitution follows
generally the Constitution of Iowa. Sixty-six of the 137 sections of the original
Constitution of California appear to have been taken from the Constitution of Iowa,




I. Constitution of 1879
A. Constitutional Convention of 1878-1879.
September 5, 1877, the people of California voted in favor of
calling a convention to revise the State's constitution. This was fol-
lowed by an act of the Legislature setting up the convention. Looking
forward to this act, the editors of the San Francisco Law Journal, in
their issue of November 3, 1877, emphasized the importance of hav-
ing a convention "large enough to represent all of the leading interests
of a great and rapidly-growing state."'132 They stated:
In the convention which framed the old constitution there were
forty-eight members, and they began their work on the first day of
September, 1849, concluding it on the thirteenth day of October
following, occupying altogether less than one month and a half. It
was at a time when gold fever was at its hight and the only
interest of importance in the territory out of which the new State
was to be formed was that of mining. The population of the
country was not permanent, and at most did not exceed one hun-
dred thousand. . . The present population of the State is prob-
ably about 800,000, and the interests of the country are almost as
diversified as in any other State of the Union. Mining is no longer
the only industry, nor indeed the -principal occupation of our
people. We have an immense agricultural interest; our commerce
commands the tribute of the civilized world; our railways are pene-
trating every comer of the State; manufacturers and all the advo-
cations of life now demand the fostering care of legislation, and
year by year grow in importance.
133
The anticipated Enabling Act,134 approved March 30, 1878,,pro-
vided for the election on June 19, 1878, of 152 delegates to meet in
convention at Sacramento on September 28, 1878, to frame a new
constitution. Specified numbers of delegates were to be elected by
specified counties: 32 by the State at large, 8 from each Congressional
District.
The election of delegates took place in a period of economic de-
pression and political controversy. Dennis Kearney and the members
of his Workingmenfs Party were demanding that cheap Chinese labor
be eliminated, land monopoly be restricted, and other economic reforms
132. The Constitutional Convention, 1 SAN F.NCISCO L.J. 145 (1877).
133. Id. at 145-46.
134. 1 E. WILLIS & P. STOCKTON, DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTrrU-
TIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 11 (1880) [hereinafter cited as
CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION].
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be effected."3 5 They made a determined effort to elect enough dele-
gates to control the convention.'36
In most counties, the Democrats and Republicans made joint nom-
inations of nonpartisan delegates. 137  In each of the four Congres-
sional Districts, conventions were held without regard to politics at
which nonpartisan delegates-at-large were nominated.' 38 When the
votes were counted it was found that 77 nonpartisans, 51 Working-
men, 11 Republicans, 10 Democrats and 3 Independents had been
elected. 139 Of the total number of delegates, 57 were lawyers; of the
32 delegates elected by the State at large, 22 were lawyers. 40 "That
California was still a pioneer state is indicated by the fact that only two
of the one hundred fifty-two delegates had been born in the state."''
One of the convention's important standing committees was an-
nounced on October 8, 1878; it was the Committee on Judiciary and
Judicial Department (Judiciary Committee).' 42 Samuel M. Wilson,
a well-known and highly-paid corporation lawyer of San Francisco,
was named chairman. In the course of the convention, he stated that
his committee was composed of 19 lawyers, some of whom were the
oldest lawyers in the State, and who for many years had been attending
every session of the Supreme Court.' 43 He referred to the fact that
two members of the committee-Isaac S. Belcher and David S. Terry
135. II J. BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 385, 389-402 (2d ed. 1891)
[hereinafter cited as BRYCE].
136. For Kearneyism in California, see BRYCE, supra note 135, at 385. Bryce
visited San Francisco in 1881 and again in 1883. Id. at 388 n.1. See also W. DAVIS,
HISTORY OF POLITICAL CONVENTIONS IN CALIFORNIA, 1849-1892, chs. XXVII-XXVIII
(STATE LIBRARY pub. 1893) [hereinafter cited as DAVIS]; IV T. HITTELL, HISTORY OF
CALIFORNIA ch. XI (1897); C. SWISHER, MOTIVATION AND POLITICAL TECHNIQUE IN
THE CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1878-1879, ch. I (1930) [hereinafter
cited as SWISHER].
"Although Kearney's violent stand against the Chinese was unpopular in some
reform circles, he did advocate measures such as taxation and restraint of railroads,
control of public utilities and the eight-hour day that were well supported by the
State Grange and other respectable groups. With such backing, Kearney and his newly
formed Workingmen's Party of California (W.P.C.) forced the calling of a constitu-
tional convention." Hall, The San Francisco Chronicle: Its Fight for the 1879 Con-
stitution, 46 JOURNALISM Q. 505, 509 (1969).
137. DAVIS, supra note 136, at 389.
138. Id.
139. For a list of the delegates to the Convention giving "Names and Party
Electing," "Former Pol." (i.e. political party), and "Occupation." See id. at 390-92.
140. Id.
141. SWISHER, supra note 136, at 31.
142. 1 CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 134, at 63.
143. 3 id. at 1455.
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-had been justices of the Supreme Court. The Davis list of delegates
shows that 15 members of the committee were elected to the convention
as nonpartisans, 2 as Republicans, and 2 as Workingmen.'
The Constitutional Convention met September 28, 1878, and ad-
journed March 3, 1879.115 The new constitution was adopted May 7,
1879, by a vote of 77,959 to 67,134.146 According to Davis, "Most
of the newspapers of the state were bitterly opposed to its adoption, the
San Francisco Chronicle being the only leading newspaper that fa-
vored it."'' 47
In their issue of April 20, 1878, the editors of the Pacific Coast
Law Journa' 48 called attention to a "Plan of a Judicial System" pub-
lished in pamphlet form by Solomon Heydenfeldt, a former justice of
the Supreme Court. The pamphlet, according to the editors, submitted
to the profession a draft of an entirely new article for the future constitu-
tion, to be entitled "The Judicial Department." The proposed new
article provided for a Supreme Court, three courts of appeal, county
courts, and justices' and police courts. The county court would have
law, equity, probate, criminal, and special proceedings jurisdiction, as
well as appellate jurisdiction from justices' and.police courts. No terms
were to be stated, but the court would always be open for business.
149
In response to Heydenfeldt's proposal that three courts of appeal
be established, Judge Eugene Fawcett of the First Judicial District sub-
mitted to the bar a "plan for the reorganization of the Supreme Court"
which was published in the Pacific Coast Law Journal of June 1,
1878.150 He first stated his objections to Justice Heydenfeldt's pro-
posal: the cost and delay in carrying causes through two appellate
courts; the increase in the number of courts with attendant expense to
both State and litigants; and the unwieldiness of a Supreme Court of
nine justices. 5 ' Judge Fawcett then proposed that the Supreme Court
144. DAvis, supra note 79, at 390-92.
145. Id. at 393.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Baggett, Current Topics, 1 PAC. COAST L.J. 141 (Baggett ed. 1878).
149. Heydenfeldt's proposal that terms of court be abolished was generally ap-
proved, and became a distinctive feature of the new constitution. See CAL. CONST.
art. VI, § 4 (1879). Roscoe Pound, after referring to the fact that the English Judica-
ture Act of 1873 had abolished terms of court, suggested that this feature of the Eng-
lish Act was reflected by the California Constitution of 1879. R. PoUND, ORGAm-
Z7rIoN OF COURTS 167 (1940) [hereinafter cited as R. PoUND]. Pound further stated
that "[tlerms were abolished in California [1879], Washington [1889], Montana [1889],
and Arizona [19123." Id. at 175.
150. Baggett, Current Topics, 1 PAc. COAST L.J. 261 (Baggett ed. 1878).
151. Id.
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consist of six justices; that it be divided into two sections; that each
section composed of any three of the justices have authority to hear
and to determine appeals and to exercise its original jurisdiction; that
the sections be authorized to sit at the same time at the same or differ-
ent places; and that cases necessarily involving constitutional questions
be argued before the full bench along with other specified cases.' 52
After pointing out that he had merely outlined his proposals, Judge
Fawcett stated, "I do not claim entire originality for the plan, Alexander
H. Stephens of Georgia having proposed, in Congress, a somewhat sim-
ilar division of the Supreme Court of the United States."' 153
In line with Justice Heydenfeldt's proposal that county courts be
established with law, equity, probate, criminal, and special proceedings
jurisdiction, were proposals by James A. Waymire, published in the
Pacific Coast Law Journal of July 6, 1878: "For the district, county,
probate, and criminal courts, substitute municipal courts-one for each
county or [city and county] capable of expansion into as many branches
as may be necessary." '154 In the Pacific Coast Law Journal of July 20,
152. Id. at 261-62.
153. Id. at 262. Various proposals to relieve the burdens of the Supreme Court
of the United States were discussed by Felix Frankfurter in The Business of the
Supreme Court of the United States-A Study in the Federal Judicial System (pt. II),
39 HA v. L. REv. 35 (1925) [hereinafter cited as Frankfurter]. He noted that "[an
early suggestion for the division of the Supreme Court into sections appears in
1876," citing The Supreme Court, 9 Am. L. REv. 668, 675 (1876). Frankfurter, supra
at 62 n.124. Referring to the English practice the 1876 article stated: "[T]he separate
courts of common law, too, often sit in two divisions, and, by this means, it is said,
the Queen's Bench has recently disposed of nearly all the arrears in that court.
The same plan has also been adopted for the proposed Court of Appeal." The Supreme
Court, 9 AM. L. REv. 668, 675 (1876). Roscoe Pound assumed that the Judicature
Act of 1875, which had authorized the English Court of Appeal to sit in divisions, had
served as a "model" for California. R. POUND, supra note 149, at 166.
154. Waymire, Our Judicial System, I PAC. COAST L.J. 367, 370 (1878). Pound
referred to another development of major significance: "The constitution of 1879
took a notable step forward by leaving the county and probate courts out of the
enumeration of constitutional courts and committing 'all matters of probate' to the
superior court, the court of general jurisdiction of first instance. This had already
been done in Nevada and was followed in Montana. Washington, Wyoming, Utah,
and Arizona." R. POUND, supra note 149, at 178-79. Simes and Basye, after quoting an
argument made in the Nevada Constitutional Convention (1864) in favor of combining
the jurisdiction of the district and county courts, stated: "Whether California was in-
fluenced by the reform in Nevada is not clear. At least no reference to the system
already in operation in Nevada is to be found. From the discussions on this proposed
system, it is probable that California was influenced solely by considerations peculiar
to itself.
"This plan of conferring probate jurisdiction upon the courts of general jurisdiction
was widely copied from California, especially in the western states." L. SIMES & P.
BASYE, The Organization of the Probate Court in America, PROBLEMS IN PROBATE LAW
385, 425 (1946).
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1878,155 reference was made to a draft of an entire constitution pre-
pared by E. D. Sawyer of the San Francisco Bar: "The plan for a judi-
ciary has been taken from that of Hon. Sol. Heydenfeldt, which we have
heretofore noticed." 156
Following the announcement on October 8, 1878, of the appoint-
ment of the Judiciary Committee,11 7 members of the Constitutional
Convention proposed numerous changes in the existing judicial sys-
tem. 158 A judicial department proposed by Thomas H. Laine of Santa
Clara on October 11, 1878,159 became a source of the committee's
final report.
Two reports of the committee's progress were published on Octo-
ber 26, 1878: one in the California Legal Record,160 the other in the
Pacific Coast Law Journal.161 According to the first report, the
committee was inclined to leave the system as it then existed, with one
exception-it wished to abolish district courts and probate courts as
separate entities, and to place the whole judicial procedure of the county
in county courts as proposed by Delegate Laine. According to the
second report, the committee had agreed that the judicial power should
be vested in a Supreme Court, superior courts, justices' courts, and
such inferior courts as the Legislature might establish; also, the commit-
tee agreed that a commission of five might be appointed by the Legis-
lature to act as an appellate court to assist the Supreme Court when
necessary.
155. Baggett, Current Topics, 1 PAC. COAST L.i. 401-02 (Baggett ed. 1878).
156. Referring to early justices of the California Supreme Court still living in
1881, Justice Field of the United States Supreme Court observed that "En]o one ever
questioned the integrity or ability of Hydenfeldt [sic] .... ." Graham, Four Letters of
Mr. Justice Field, 47 YALE L.L 1100, 1101 (1938).
157. See text accompanying notes 142-44 supra.
158. 1 CALIFORNIA CONSTrrtmONAL CONVENTION, supra note 134, at 77 (Edger-
ton), 78 (Hager), 82 (Rolfe), 94 (Cross), 95 (Dean), 102 (Smith), 111 (Edgerton),
113 (Lane), 119 (Shoemaker), 140 (Mansfield), 141 (Martin), 142 (McCallum),
144 (Tully), 155 (Hager), 165 (Edgerton), 165 (Schell), 219 (Barton), 225 (Graves),
250 (Barbour). The proposals ranged from complete schemes of court organization
to single features such as the appointment, instead of the election, of judges. A sig-
nificant number proposed that the Supreme Court sit in divisions, and that there be
one trial court with all types of jurisdiction. Hager's first proposal (October 9, 1878)
included a provision that district courts have multiple judges, each to hold court at the
same time.
159. Id. at 113.
160. Legal Notes, 2 CAL. LEGAL RECORD 37, 39 (1878).
161. Baggett, Current Topics, 2 PAC. COAST LJ. 161, 163 (Baggett ed. 1878).
Notes and memoranda of the proceedings of the Committee made by its Secretary
were not preserved due to the Secretary's death. 2 CAiwORNiA CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION, supra note 134, at 972.
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A few days after these progress reports were published, the San
Francisco Bar Association adopted a plan of judicial organization and
sent Judge John W. Dwinelle to Sacramento to present it to the com-
mittee. This plan, as reported in the California Legal Record of No-
vember 2, 1878,162 made the following proposals: abolish inferior trial
courts, leaving only superior courts; give equal powers to all superior
court judges; provide one judge for each of 48 counties out of 52, three
judges for 3 specified counties, and for San Francisco County, a single
court with ten judges of equal powers--one assigned to probate mat-
ters, another to criminal, and so on. 163  It was further recommended
that there be one Supreme Court composed of one Chief Justice and six
assistant justices. The latter were to be divided into two departments
of three each, and the Chief Justice was to preside in either depart-
ment. Henry Edgerton, a member of the Judiciary Committee, stated
to the convention that the scheme of having the Supreme Court sit
in two departments had been approved by many eminent judges and
lawyers in San Francisco, and had been devised by the bar association
of that city, "borrowing it theoretically from the suggestions in the bill
of Alexander H. Stevens, introduced into the House of Representatives,
and which receives the sanction of Judge Davis in the Senate of the
United States."'
' 64
The following is an outline of the court system approved by the
convention and incorporated in article VI of the California Constitu-
tion of 1879:
COURTS OF JUSTICE
Supreme Court-to consist of a Chief Justice and six asso-
ciate justices; may sit in two three-judge departments and in
bank; to be always open for business.
162. Legal Notes, 2 CAL. LEGAL RECORD 49, 58 (1878).
163. In ORGANIZATION OF COURTS at 176, Roscoe Pound stated: "California, in
1879, fixed the number of judges of the Superior Court for each county, allowing the
legislature to make changes, and provided that there could be as many separate ses-
sions at the same time as there were judges. In such cases the judges could choose
a presiding judge to distribute the business. In Minnesota, where there was more
than one judge in a district, the constitutional amendment of 1875 allowed each to
exercise the powers of the court under such limitations as might be prescribed by law.
Nevada [1864] provided that in the district in which there were three judges, they
should have 'co-extensive and concurrent' jurisdiction." According to Pound, Colorado
and Arizona adopted similar provisions after 1879. Id.
164. 3 CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 134, at 1456. The
Judge Davis referred to was, presumably, Senator Davis of Illinois who had been a
justice of the Supreme Court of the United States. Frankfurter, supra note 153, at 60.
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Superior Courts-one for each county or city and county;
specified courts to have one judge, others to have two judges,
San Francisco to have twelve judges; to be always open (legal
holidays and nonjudicial days excepted).
Justices' Courts-number to be fixed by the Legislature.
Inferior Courts-to be established at discretion of the Legis-
lature in any incorporated city, or town, or city and county.
JUDICIAL OFFICERS
Justices of the Supreme Court-to be elected by electors of
the State at large; to hold office for 12 years.
Judges of Superior Courts-to be elected by electors of
county, or city and county; to hold office for 6 years.
Justices of the Peace-to be elected in townships, incorpo-
rated cities and towns, or cities and counties.
Judges of inferior courts-powers, duties, and responsibili-
ties to be fixed by law.
Superior Court Commissioners-Legislature may provide for
appointment of one or more commissioners by each superior
court; to perform chamber business of the judges; to take
depositions; to perform such other business as may be pre-
scribed by law.
OTHER OFFICERS
Clerk of Supreme Court-election to be provided by the Leg-
islature.
Supreme Court Reporter-to be appointed by justices; to
hold office and be removable at their pleasure.
County Clerks-to be ex officio clerks of courts of record in
respective counties, or cities and counties.
SUBJECT-MATTER YURISDICTION
Supreme Court-appellate jurisdiction of cases in equity (ex-
cept such as arise in justices' courts), cases at law involving
title or possession of real estate, the legality of any tax, im-
post, assessment or municipal fine, and demands amounting
to $300, and in cases of forcible entry and detainer, proceed-
ings in insolvency, actions to prevent or abate a nuisance,
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probate matters as provided by law, questions of law in crim-
inal cases prosecuted by indictment or information in courts
of record; court to have power to issue writs of mandamus,
certiorari, prohibition, habeas corpus, and other writs neces-
sary or proper to the complete exercise of its appellate juris-
diction; each justice individually to have power to issue writs
of habeas corpus.
Superior Courts-original jurisdiction of all cases in equity,
of certain cases at law involving title or possession of real
property, the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, toll, or
municipal fine, and demands amounting to $300, and of
criminal cases amounting to felony, misdemeanor cases not
otherwise provided for, actions of forcible entry and detainer,
proceedings in insolvency, actions to prevent or abate a nui-
sance, all matters of probate, divorce, and for annulment of
marriage, and special cases and proceedings not otherwise
provided for; to have power of naturalization; appellate juris-
diction of cases arising in justices' courts and other inferior
courts as are prescribed by law; courts and judges to have
power to issue writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, quo
warranto, and habeas corpus.
Justices of the Peace-powers, duties, and responsibilities to
be fixed by law; not to encroach on jurisdiction of courts of
record, but shall have concurrent jurisdiction with superior
courts in cases of forcible entry and detainer where rental
value does not exceed $25 per month and damages are not in
excess of $200, and in cases to enforce liens on personal prop-
erty where neither the lien nor the value of the property ex-
ceeds $300.
Inferior courts-to be fixed by the Legislature.
VENUE AND RANGE OF PROCESS
Superior Courts-process to extend to all parts of the State;
actions to recover possession of, quiet title to, or enforce
liens upon real estate, are to be commenced in the county
where the real estate or any part of it is situated.
B. Supreme Court
When the report of the Judiciary Committee was presented to the
Constitutional Convention on January 8, 1879, Robert Crouch, a law-
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yer from Napa, moved to strike the provision which increased the num-
ber of Supreme Court justices to seven and authorized them to sit in
two departments. He proposed, instead, that the justices of the existing
court be reduced from five to three, saying, "I think a Court of three
men is sufficient to transact all the business . "... 65 In reply, the
chairman of the committee referred to a report made to the convention
by the clerk of the Supreme Court showing that during the past 4 years
the court had decided 2,242 cases, an average of 566 and one-half
cases a year, requiring "an almost incredible amount of labor;" but to
accomplish that work it had to decide 559 cases without giving any
opinion in writing.' The chairman predicted that seven justices sitting
in two departments would be able to keep abreast of the flow of cases,
and write opinions in all."'
When the matter came before the convention on February 11,
1879, Clitus Barbour, a Workingmen Party lawyer from San Francisco,
offered a substitute providing for seven justices and two departments;
but instead of prescribing in the constitution the procedure to be fol-
lowed in operating the court in departments, he proposed, for the sake
of better control, that this be regulated by the Legislature. To give
unheard of powers, as he felt the procedures prescribed in the constitu-
tion did, to a Chief Justice you cannot get rid of for 12 years is a
"monstrous proposition."'"" The chairman of the Judiciary Committee
replied that he did not see any "horror" in it, or anything to "alarm"
anybody, nor did the committee see anything of the kind in the sec-
tion. 60 James S. Reynolds, another Workingmen Party lawyer from
San Francisco, argued that an "inflexible rule" giving the Chief Justice
the entire power of assigning justices to departments, and of assigning
business, should not be in the constitution. "It never was done before,
and this is one of the experiments we do not need to try.' '1 6 On a
later occasion he stated: "I have been examining the constitutions of
the other states, and I can find nothing like it between the lids of any
book. . . . I can find nothing like these transcendental powers given
to a Chief Justice."'' N. G. Wyatt, a Workingmen Party lawyer from
Monterey County, likened the powers given to the Chief Justice to those
165. 2 CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 134, at 950.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 951.
168. 3 id. at 1331.
169. Id.
170. Id; at 1332.
171. Id. at 1454.
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of the Czar of Russia; that his powers are "so plenary" and "so unlike
anything that has gone before him, that he is entitled to that degree
which the Emperor of China has found necessary to give to Chin Lan
Pin. . . . [I]n consequence of . . . the great power conferred upon
him, [the Emperor] had honored him with the decoration of the third
order of the peacock feather."' 72 C. W. Cross, a Workingmen Party
lawyer from Nevada County, proposed that three justices of the court
be authorized to order a case heard in bank; after an amendment sug-
gested by Chairman Wilson that the number be four, the proposal was
adopted.
171
A note in the California Legal Record of April 6, 1878, referred
to a law passed at the last session of the Legislature providing "that
after October next the January and July terms of the Supreme Court
shall be held in San Francisco,-the April and October terms in Los
Angeles, and the May and November terms in Sacramento.' 74  In its
issue of May 11, 1878, the Record noted that the clerk of the Supreme
Court would start for Los Angeles the next day "to make arrange-
ments for court room, etc." for the court's October term which was to
be "the first term under the new law.'117 5
172. Id. at 1454-55.
173. Id. at 1333. In ORGANIZATION OF COURTS at 166, Roscoe Pound outlined,
with apparent approval, the procedure which the Workingmen Party lawyers in the
constitutional convention referred to as unprecedented-transcendental-monstrous.
"The California constitution established a Supreme Court of a Chief Justice and six
associate justices who, after the model of the Judicature Act, were authorized to sit in
two departments as assigned by the Chief Justice and changed by him from time to
time. The associate justices were made competent to sit in either department and
might interchange among themselves or as ordered by the Chief Justice. The Chief
Justice was to apportion the business of the court between the departments or might
order a case to be heard before the court in bank, but after judgment in a department
such an order was required to be made within thirty days, and to be concurred in by
two justices, thus providing for a rehearing. Either before or after judgment in a de-
partment four justices might order a cause to be heard in bank. The Chief Justice
could order a court in bank at any time, four being necessary to constitute it, and the
concurrence of four being required for a judgment. The Chief Justice was to preside
when the court sat in bank. Also, he might sit and preside in either department, but
the judges assigned to each department were to choose one of their number to exercise
the powers of the Chief Justice during his absence or inability to act." Pound intro-
duced his discussion with this statement: "Among the relatively new features with
respect to the highest court of review developed in the constitutions we are consid-
ering, first place must be given to the organization of the Supreme Court laid down in
the constitution of California in 1879." Id. at 165. He concluded by referring to the
fact that the constitutions of Kansas and Colorado were amended in 1900 and 1904
to provide for a supreme court of seven justices authorized to sit separately in divi-
sions or departments. Id. at 166.
174. Legal Notes, 1 CAL. LEGAL RECORD 39-40 (1878).
175. Legal Notes, 1 CAL. LEGAL REcoRD 121 (1878).
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October 9, 1878, Henry Edgerton from Sacramento proposed to
the constitutional convention that all terms of the Supreme Court be
held "at the seat of government."'7 8  This was referred to and subse-
quently approved by the Judiciary Committee,177 of which Edgerton
was a member, but when the matter came before the convention on
January 8, 1879, there was vigorous opposition. Volney E. Howard
from Los Angeles moved that the section be amended to provide for
sessions not only "at the capital of the State," but also "in Los Angeles
and such other places the Legislature may provide.' 78  The chairman
of the Judiciary Committee opposed the amendment, pointing out the
expense of maintaining two courtrooms in three different places with
clerks, deputies, and records in each place.'7 9  He emphasized the
importance of having an adequate library such as had been provided
at Sacramento, and noted that under the proposed amendment the court
could not "always be in session, on account of the time consumed in
traveling."'8 " Although one-third of the business of the court was
being transacted in San Francisco, the lawyers of that city, according
to the chairman, were willing to give up the convenience of having
the court sit at their "very doors" in exchange for a system that would
"insure a more speedy dispatch of business."
In the debate that followed, two principal questions were raised:
(1) Which is better, a Supreme Court held at one place (the State
capital), or a Supreme Court held at different places in the State,
referred to as a "Court on wheels?"'' (2) If the latter, should the
places be fixed by constitutional provision, or left to the Legislature?
After extended discussion which included the climate, population, and
other features of the three cities mentioned, Byron Waters, a delegate-
at-large from the Fourth Congressional District, moved to strike the
whole provision, warning, "You had better leave this to the Legisla-
ture."'1 2 His motion was carried by a vote of 64 to 45. 83 This result
must have placated those who had suggested that any provision adopted
would antagonize many voters, and jeopardize the approval of the
constitution.
176. 1 CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 134, at 77.
177. Id. at 392.
178. 2 id. at 950.
179. Id. at 951.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 954.
182. Id. at 956.
183. Id. at 957.
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Another choice between constitutional and statutory regulation was
presented when the convention was called upon to approve a section
authorizing the justices of the Supreme Court to appoint a reporter of
their decisions who should hold his office and be removable at their
pleasure, his annual salary not to exceed $2500. Former Justice
Belcher, a member of the Judiciary Committee, stated that "this section
would not have been suggested by the Committee if it had not been
for the fact that the Legislature had changed this appointment from
the Court to the Governor.' 8
4
Horace C. Rolf, a lawyer from San Diego and San Bernadino
counties, moved to strike it out as "entirely unnecessary in the Consti-
tution," stating: "This is one among many things that had just as well
be left to the Legislature. I am sick and tried of having matters
of so little importance thrust upon this Convention, when so many
weighty matters are waiting our attention."'18 5  Belcher replied:
"[T]his is one of those provisions that ought to be inserted in the
Constitution. It is proper that the salary should be limited. It is
proper that the Judges should have the appointment. The section puts
it where it has always been up to the last session of the legislature."' 86
In addition to Belcher, other delegates spoke in favor of a consti-
tutional limitation on the reporter's salary. N. G. Wyatt, a Working-
men Party lawyer from Monterey County, thought that if the matter
remained in the hands of the Legislature "then they will have the
salary five or ten thousand dollars a year [rather than twenty-five
hundred], as it can be lobbied through the Legislature."' 87 John P.
West, a Workingmen Party farmer from Los Angeles County, observed,
"I think by retaining this section in the Constitution we would avoid
all that jobbing."' 88 The section was retained.
184. Id. at 1000. The California Legal Record of April 13, 1878, noted: "By an
act of the last Legislature the appointment of Reporter of the decisions of the
Supreme Court of this State, was taken from the Judges of the Court and vested in
the Governor. Hon. Gideon J. Carpenter, of El Dorado, who represented that county
as Assemblyman for two terms, during the last of which, two years since, he filled
the responsible position of Speaker, has been selected to fill this important office for
four years. The new appointee is an old resident of California, is an able lawyer,
and will undoubtedly discharge the arduous duties of his position satisfactorily to all
parties." Legal Notes, 1 CAL. LEGAL REcoRD 41 (1878).
185. 3 CALIFORNIA CONsTiTroNAL CONVENTION, supra note 134, at 999-1000.
186. Id. at 1000.
187. Id.
188. Id. In H THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH, supra note 135, at 390, Bryce
stated: "The legislature was composed almost wholly either of office-seekers from the
city or petty country lawyers, needy and narrow-minded men. Those who had virtue
enough not to be 'got at' by the great corporations, had not intelligence enough to know
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C. Other Courts
The county and probate courts established under the Constitution
of 1849 were readily accessible, but it was found that many county
judges did not have sufficient work to keep them busy at al times.
The judge of the district court was available in a particular county only
during terms of court held in that county, and when needed in a civil
or criminal matter at other times, he might be holding court in some
distant county, and not readily available. The "simple" solution was
to combine the three courts into one superior court for each county
with "perpetual sessions." This solution would have pleased the Eng-
lish reformer, Jeremy Bentham, who "warmly and constantly advocated
the establishment of local courts within at the very least half a day's
journey of every individual, courts which should deal out every kind
of justice that might be required . . . accessible, like hospitals, every
day in the year, and at every hour in the night.'
8 9
The "simple" solution, referred to above, was widely accepted both
before and during the constitutional convention. There remained,
however, two questions to be answered: (1) What if the business of a
particular superior court proves to be too much for one judge? (2)
What if the business of a particular superior court is not sufficient to
keep one judge busy at all times? The answer to the first question was
to provide additional judges for the particular court, each with power
to hold the court at the same time. This solution was generally ap-
proved. A proposed answer to the second question was a provision
authorizing the Legislature to provide one judge for two or more coun-
ties.
In line with this suggestion, former Justice Belcher, a member
of the Judiciary Committee, moved "that until otherwise ordered by the
Legislature, only one Judge shall be elected for the Counties of Yuba
how to resist their devices. It was a common saying in the State that each successive
legislature was worse than its predecessor. The meeting of the representatives of the
people was seen with anxiety: their departure with relief. Some opprobrious epithet
was bestowed upon each. One was 'the legislature of a thousand drinks'; another 'the
legislature of a thousand steals."' In MOTIVATION AND PoLrncAL TECHNIQUE IN THE
CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1878-1879, supra note 136, at 96, Swisher
stated: "If the delegates had come to the convention determined to cinch capital,
tax mortgages, and expel the Chinese, they were also determined to put the legislature
in its place. Session after session charges of incompetence and corruption had been
made against the legislature, not always without reason. The convention set out to
chastise the legislature by limiting its sphere of action, through depriving it of most
of its powers of special legislation."
189. A CENTURY OF LAW REFORM 231 (London 1901).
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and Sutter."'190 In support of this motion Belcher stated that he knew
that one judge could take care of all the business of the superior courts
of the two counties and that no inconvenience would result as the
county seats of the two counties were within 15 or 20 minutes walk of
each other.' 91
While agreeing to Belcher's particular proposal, another member
of the Judiciary Committee, George V. Smith, strongly opposed any
grant of power to the Legislature to make similar combinations of
other counties. Smith pointed out that under the old system the pro-
bate judge was always available when needed; but by giving probate
powers to a superior court judge and then providing that he hold court
in two or more counties, "you throw it back to the position of a Circuit
Judge or District Judge without the advantage of the Probate Judge
being in the county."'1 9 2  Dennis W. Herrington, a Workingmen Party
lawyer from Santa Clara county, accused Wilson, chairman of the Ju-
diciary Committee, of having repudiated the court plan proposed and
"unanimously approved" by the committee. 193 Chairman Wilson hotly
denied that he or his committee had abandoned their "grand plan" of
having a superior court and judge in each county; he had agreed to one
special exception and recognized the possibility of others, but pre-
ferred that the original plan be adopted without any change, emphasiz-
ing the importance of having a probate judge always present in each
190. 2 CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 134, at 969.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 973-74. Continuing, Smith said: "The judge may be located hundreds
of miles over the mountains where the railroads can never run, and where it takes two
weeks to go and come. In the meantime our probate business cannot be attended to.
Other matters cannot be attended to. As it is now, we have almost practically no
District Court down there; our Judge has to travel over these mountains, and is
gone most of the time." Id. at 974.
193. Id. at 974. Referring to the plan originally proposed by the Judiciary
Committee, Harrington stated: "It was a system that was unanimously agreed to, as I
understand it, by that committee. It was a system that was based upon three primary
main propositions: First, that the people would have justice at their doors, without
having the necessity of traveling a long distance to obtain it. Next, they would have
perpetual sessions, and business could be transacted constantly in these courts. In
the immediate future, all the interests of litigants would be attended to. The other
was that of dispensing with numerous Courts, or rather, a consolidation of jurisdiction;
the doing away, so far as that is concerned, with this thing of terms for Court in the
various counties. . . . They are asking now to engraft upon this same system, a sys-
tem of District Courts by having the Courts sit first in one county, and then sit in
another county. . . . Now, where is all this beautifully spun theory with reference
to the consolidation of jurisdiction in one Judge, and this beautiful theory of con-
tinuous sessions, and this beautiful open theory of having justice administered at the
very doors of litigants? It has all vanished into thin air .... "
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 22
county.194 Belcher's proposed amendment was defeated 70 to 45,195
and no similar provision, except for Yuba and Sutter counties, was in
the constitution as finally approved.
Section 5 of article VI as finally approved declared that the su-
perior courts "shall be always open (legal holidays and nonjudicial
days excepted), and their process shall extend to all parts of the State;
provided, that all actions for the recovery of the possession of, quieting
the title to, or for the enforcement of liens upon real estate, shall be
commenced in the county in which the real estate, or any part thereof
affected by such action or actions, is situated." The venue proviso
was not in section 5 as proposed by the Judiciary Committee, but was
added when the section came before the convention on February 11,
1879.06 In view of the provision that the superior court's process
would extend to all parts of the State, fears were expressed that the
Legislature might permit corporations to enforce in their home counties
liens and mortgages on lands situated anywhere in the State.
James E. Hale, from the Second Congressional District, stated, "We
know that a very large proportion of the real property is owned or
controlled by the twenty thousand corporations of the State, and as
nineteen thousand of them, probably, have their chief place of busi-
ness in San Francisco, the business would all have to be done in the
San Francisco courts. '1 9 To a suggestion that the matter was covered
by statute, Hale replied: "We have had four or five efforts to repeal
that statute. Therefore, I hope the constitution will settle the matter
forever."'19
Empowered by the Constitution of 1849 to fix the powers, duties,
and responsibilities of justices of the peace, the Legislature, in the Court
Act of 1851, provided that they should have jurisdiction of a number
of specified matters including forcible entry and detainer, and enforce-
ment of liens on personal property.' 99 As amended in 1862, the con-
stitution provided that the county courts should have original jurisdic-
tion of forcible entry and detainer, and that powers given to justices
of the peace by the Legislature should not "trench upon the jurisdiction
of the several Courts of record."200  The Judiciary Committee of the
194. Id. at 975.
195. Id. at 976.
196. 3 id. at 1334.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. See the outline of the judicial system established by the Court Act of 1851,
outlined in text following note 67 supra.
200. CAL. CONST. art. VI, §§ 8-9 (1862).
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Constitutional Convention of 1878-1879 recommended the same limi-
tation "except that such Justices shall have concurrent jurisdiction with
the Superior Courts in cases of forcible entry and detainer, where the
rental value does not exceed twenty-five dollars per month, and where
the whole amount of damages claimed does not exceed two hundred
dollars. 201
When the matter came before the convention on January 10,
1879, former Supreme Court Justice Terry, a member of the Judiciary
Committee, moved to strike out the exception, saying, "When the Su-
perior Courts are always in session, I cannot see any reason for giving
Justices of the Peace jurisdiction over a class of cases in which some-
times the most difficult questions arise."202 As an additional reason
for striking the exception, John C. McCallum from Alameda County
stated that he had been checking the constitutions of other states and
had found no instance of a constitutional grant of forcible entry and
detainer jurisdiction to justices of the peace. If left in the California
Constitution, he said, "[W]e will stand alone in this respect. '20 3
On the other hand, S. G. Hilborn from Solano County called at-
tention to the inconvenience of being required to bring all forcible entry
and detainer cases at the county seat, noting "that there are considerable
towns growing up at a distance of from twenty to sixty miles from the
county seat." He referred to the fact that most such cases involve
"trivial" matters which ought to be decided summarily.20° The chair-
man of the Judiciary Committee, Wilson, stated that the exception had
been adopted by the committee "for the reasons, mainly, referred to by
the gentleman from Solano, Mr. Hilborn. ' 2°5 A vote was taken and
the Terry motion to strike the exception was defeated 69 to 31.206
Abraham C. Freeman from Sacramento County then moved to
amend the general provision that powers given to justices of the peace
should not overlap with jurisdiction given courts of record by adding
another exception "in cases to enforce and foreclose liens on personal
property, when neither the amount of the lien nor the value of the
property amounts to three hundred dollars. ' 2 7  After a discussion of
the desirability of giving justices of the peace equity jurisdiction in any
201. 1 CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 134, at 393.
202. 2 id. at 976.
203. Id. at 979.
204. Id. at 976.
205. Id. at 977.
206. Id. at 979.
207. Id. at 981.
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kind of case, the Freeman amendment was adopted.10 8  This led to an
amendment of section 4 which had provided that the Supreme Court
"shall have appellate jurisdiction in all cases in equity."
20 9 At a session
of the convention held February 11, 1879, the words "except such as
arise in justices' courts" were added to section 4.210
II. Supreme Court Commissioners: 1885
Commencing with January 1880, proceedings in the "new" Su-
preme Court were reported as decided in department 1, in department
2, or in bank. March 6, 1880, the editors of the Pacific Coast Law
Journal reported that the Supreme Court had delivered opinions in 94
cases since the beginning of the year, that the justices were making
rapid progress in clearing their calendar, and that before many months
they would "doubtless be even with their work."211  March 20, 1880,
the editors of the Journal made this comment: 212 "If we may judge
from the wholesale denial of applications for hearing in bank which
has just been made, the court is determined to clear up the calendar of
old cases." '213
Two years later, however, the story was different. In their issue
of February 4, 1882, the editors reported that "[a]t the commence-
ment of the January term, 1882, there were 790 cases not disposed
of."'214  July 29, 1882, they stated that responses to a note circu-
lated by them showed that almost all members of the bar wanted a
change in the mode of arguing and disposing of cases in the court, all
conceding that the practical working of a system under which a case
must remain on the calendar nearly 2 years before it is reached for
hearing and decision is a "positive denial of justice. 21 5  The editors
noted that at the opening of the January term, 1882, the Chief Justice
had remarked that members of the bar would have to rely mainly on
their briefs as the court had no time to listen to oral arguments.216
Despite the passage of 2 more years, the situation did not im-
208. Id. at 982.
209. 3 id. at 1333.
210. Id.
211. Baggett, Current Topics, 5 PAc. COAST L.J 29 (Baggett ed. 1880).
212. Baggett, Current Topics, 5 PAc. COAST L.J 85 (Baggett ed. 1880).
213. A rule governing applications for hearings in bank was included in Rules of
the Supreme Court effective March 22, 1880. Cal. Sup. Ct. R. 30, 64 Cal. 635,
645-46 (1884).
214. Baggett, Current Topics, 8 PAC. COAST L.J. 983 (Baggett ed. 1882).
215. Baggett, Current Topics, 9 PAc. COAST L. 721-22 (Baggett ed. 1882).
216. Id. at 722.
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prove. According to a statement made by Superior Court Judge A.
Van R. Peterson of San Joaquin County, reprinted in the West Coast
Reporter, February 7, 1884, the system had failed to meet the expecta-
tions of its advocates:21 7 "The working power of the two departments
of the Supreme Court is not much greater than that of a single court,
for after a hearing in department many cases are reheard in bank. ' 18
He felt that to remedy the situation, the working power of the court
should be increased to correspond to that of the 71 departments of the
superior court, that an intermediate court of appeal should be estab-
lished as in New York, or that a greater jurisdictional amount should
be required. He did not suggest the appointment of commissioners to
aid the court.
At one point in the course of their deliberations, the Judiciary
Committee of the constitutional convention agreed that a commission
of five might be appointed by the Legislature to act as an appellate court
to assist the Supreme Court when necessary.219 This was abandoned in
favor of the scheme of having the court sit in two departments.
In 1885, the Legislature, acting without constitutional authoriza-
tion, directed the Supreme Court to appoint "three persons of legal
learning and personal worth" as commissioners of the court..220  The
act provided that it should be the duty of the commissioners, under such
rules and regulations as the court might adopt, to aid and assist the
court in the performance of its duties, and in the disposition of "the
numerous causes now pending in said court undetermined." -2 2'
That Governor Stoneman was not satisfied with this development
is shown by a message he sent to the Legislature July 16, 1886.222
This message, as summarized by Hittell, averred that the existing sys-
tem had not given satisfaction, and that the evils connected with it
were growing worse instead of better. It was cumbersome and un-
wieldy. Business before it was greatly in arrears, notwithstanding the
creation of a commission to assist the justices and relieve them of a
large portion of their work. The division of the court into departments
had not worked well due to the practice of hearing cases twice without
217. Pomeroy & Pomeroy, Notes, 1 W. COAST REP. 639 (Pomeroys eds. 1884).
218. Id.
219. Baggett, Current Topics, 2 PAC. COAST L.J. 161, 163 (Baggett ed. 1878).
220. Cal. Stat. 1885, ch. 120, § 1, at 101. The text of the act and the names of
the commissioners will be found at the beginning of each volume of California Re-
ports commencing with volume 68.
221. Id.
222. IV HITTELL, HISTORY OF CALIFORNIA 693-94 (1898).
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any advantage and at the expense of too 'much time. The Governor
recommended that the constitution be amended to cure these evils.
In 1889 the number of commissioners was increased from three to
five.
2 23
In a case decided by the Supreme Court in bank on February 8,
1890,224 Justice Fox and Chief Justice Beatty discussed at length the
duties of the commissioners and their relation to the court. The case
was in the nature of quo warranto commenced in the Superior Court
of San Francisco against the five Supreme Court commissioners to in-
quire "by what authority they claim to exercise any judicial powers
within the state of California, and particularly of considering and de-
termining cases on appeal to the supreme court of the state. ' 225  The
defendants answered that their duties were not judicial, and the trial
court agreed, dismissing the action. On appeal the judgment was af-
firmed, Justice Fox stating that the commissioners "do not usurp the
functions of judges of this court, and do not exercise any judicial power
whatever. ' 226  After demonstrating that the justices, and not the com-
missioners, made the decisions, Chief Justice Beatty found it necessary
to answer this question: "[I]f the court, after receiving the report of
the commission, re-examines the case for itself, what is the use of the
commission? It saves the court no labor, and does nothing to facilitate
the disposition of causes. '' 22r The only answer given was that
[t]here are some persons in whom the literary faculty is highly de-
veloped, to whom the writing of opinions may be a trifling task; but
223. Cal. Stat. 1889, ch. 16, § 1, at 13. The text of this act and the names of
the five commissioners will be found in the California Reports beginning with volume
80. This development was noted by Roscoe Pound in ORGANIZATION OF COURTS, supra
note 149, at 204-05 (citing Cal. Stat. 1885, ch. 120; Cal. Stat. 1889, ch. 16; Cal. Stat.
1893, ch. 1; Cal. Stat. 1901, ch. 113): "When they were three, they sat as a de-
partment on cases assigned, rendering an opinion as a court, to which the Supreme
Court added a per curiam, 'for reasons given in the foregoing opinion the appeal is'
allowed or dismissed, or this or that order made, as the case might be. Or one
judge might sit with two commissioners, one of the commissioners writing the opin-
ion, and a per curiam adoption being added. When there came to be five, they sat in
rotation in a bench of three, as before, leaving two free to be writing opinions as in
the federal Circuit Courts of Appeals. Here, as in the present practice in Texas
there is a combination of the division system and the system of calling in judges to
reinforce the highest court in bank." For an illustration of the operation of the Su-
preme Court in departments, in bank, and with the aid of commissioners, see Niles
v. Edwards, 90 Cal. 10, 27 P. 159 (1891) & 95 Cal. 41, 30 P. 134 (1892) (motion
for remittitur denied).
224. People ex rel. Morgan v. Hayne, 83 Cal. 111, -23 P. 1 (1890).
225. Id. at 112.
226. Id. at 121.
227. Id. at 125.
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I apprehend that, according to the experience of most judges, the
putting of their opinions in form, even after their minds are fully
made up, is a very serious labor, requiring the expenditure of a
large portion of the time at their disposal.
By the labors of the commission, this time and much serious
labor is saved to the court and in a large proportion of the cases
referred to them, without any abdication or delegation by the court
of its constitutional functions. 228
Time saved by having commissioners listen to oral arguments was,
understandably, not mentioned.
The California experiment of combining divisions and commission-
ers was ended in 1904 when a new section was added to article VI of
the constitution providing that "[tihe present Supreme Court Commis-
sion shall be abolished at the expiration of its present term of office, and
no Supreme Court Commission shall be created or provided for after
January 1st, A.D. 1905." 229 It should be noted that at the same time
provision was made for district courts of appeal.23 °
M1. District Courts of Appeal: 1904
A. The Federal Solution
While California was experimenting with the organization of its Su-
preme Court, proposals to reorganize the Supreme Court of the United
States were being considered in Washington and elsewhere. A special
committee appointed by the American Bar Association in August 1881
filed two reports.2 ' The minority report recommended that the Su-
preme Court of the United States be divided into two or more sections,
each to hear appeals except for those more properly heard by the whole
court; 232 causes decided by each division were to be reported to the
whole court, and all judgments were to be rendered as judgments of
the whole court.233 The majority report, after referring to bills intro-
duced in Congress by Davis of Illinois, Manning of Mississippi, Miller
of California, and others, stated that the majority members of the com-
mittee were "unable," for reasons stated, "to approve any plan for di-
viding the [United States] Supreme Court," having "reached the con-
228. Id.
229. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 25.
230. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 4 (1904).
231. Stevenson, Bradley, King, Lawton & Hitchcock, Majority Report on the Re-
lief of the United States Courts, V A.B.A. REP. 343 (1882); Phelps, Parker, Evarts &
Merrick, Minority Report on the Relief of the United States Courts, V A.B.A. REP.
363 (1882).
232. Minority Report, supra note 231, at 368.
233. Id. at 370.
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clusion that the general scheme for the relief of the federal judiciary
which proposes the establishment of intermediate courts of appeal in
the several circuits is that which promises the largest measure of suc-
cess.' 3
In the Pacific Coast Law Journal of January 14, 1882, the editors
referred to the Davis bill as providing for a federal court of appeal in
each circuit.235  They urged support of the bill so "the people and
the bar in each circuit will have an Appellate Court at home," noting
that members of the Washington Bar were pushing vigorously for a di-
vision of the United States Supreme Court into coordinate departments
or the establishment of a subordinate court of appeals in Washington.236
The plan of establishing a court of appeals in each federal circuit was
adopted in 1891.231
B. California's Division of Appellate Business
The 1904 amendment to the California Constitution23 divided the
State into three appellate districts, specifying the counties that were to
comprise each district. It also established in each district a district
court of appeal, consisting of three justices to be elected by the electors
of the districts. The amendment further provided that the district
courts of appeal should hold their regular sessions respectively at San
Francisco, Los Angeles, and Sacramento, and should always be open
for business.
When the multi-division Supreme Court was being discussed in
the constitutional convention, the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee
stated that the judges of a department could properly review the "ordi-
nary current of cases" leaving the "great and important" cases to the
court in bank, the latter being necessary to secure uniformity of deci-
sions and to settle important questions of law.239 This classification
was fundamental, and there was no difficulty in using it as a guide as
long as all appeals went to one court having a chief justice empowered
to classify and assign the cases.
When the appellate courts were established, it was understood that
appeals in the "ordinary current of cases" would go to the appellate
234. Majority Report, supra note 231, at 357, 360.
235. Baggett, Current Topics, 8 PAc. COAST L.J. 835 (Baggett ed. 1882).
236. Id. at 836.
237. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826; R. POUND, supra note 149, at
198.
238. CAL.. CONST. art. VI, § 4 (1904).
239. 2 CALIFORNI CONSTrruTIONAL CONvENTION, supra note 134, at 951.
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courts whereas appeals in "great and important" cases would go to the
Supreme Court. But, to avoid double appeals, it was thought neces-
sary to provide a means of determining before appeal to which court a
particular case should go. The scheme adopted, suggested by the fed-
eral development, was twofold:240 First, appeals from superior courts
in specified types of cases (equity cases, land cases, law cases involving
more than $2000, and certain others) were to go to the Supreme Court;
appeals from superior courts in other specified types of cases were to go
to a court of appeal. Second, after appeal, the Supreme Court would
have power to transfer an appealed case from itself to one of the courts
of appeal, or from a court of appeal to itself, or from one court of appeal
to another.
The division of appellate jurisdiction between the Supreme Court
and the appellate courts only remotely promoted the separation of "ordi-
nary cases" from the "great and important" cases.2 4' A "case in
equity" might or might not involve a significant question of law. And
there was the necessity of distinguishing "cases at law" from "cases in
equity"-a distinction which had been abolished by the Code of Civil
Procedure.242 There was the further necessity of distinguishing "cases
at law" which involved $2000 from "cases at law" which did not involve
$2000. The latter distinction was made unnecessary by an amendment
to article VI in 1928 which provided that all appeals in "cases at law"
except land title cases and cases involving the legality of any tax, impost,
assessment, toll, or municipal fine, should go to a court of appeal re-
gardless of the amount involved. The provision for transfer of an ap-
pealed case both before and after decision made it possible for the Su-
preme Court to correct any mistake made in selecting the right appellate
court,243 and also made it possible for the court to classify a particular
240. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 4 (1904).
241. The only grant of jurisdiction which clearly fell on one side of the dividing
line was that which provided that appeals in cases involving "the legality of any tax,
impost, assessment, toll or municipal fine" should go to the Supreme Court regardless
of the amount involved. For the origin of this jurisdictional-amount exception, see
text accompanying note 22 supra.
242. See text accompanying note 86 supra. In ORGANIZATION OF COURTS, supra
note 149, at 234, Roscoe Pound stated: "The reports show a little over fifty cases on
points of the distribution of jurisdiction decided in twenty years after these courts were
set up. The exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in equity cases is
capable of raising nice questions as to what are such under the procedure of today.
By 1922, eleven such questions had been before the courts. See 7 Cal. Jur. 769."
243. In New California Rules on Appeal, 17 S. CAL. L. REv. 232 (1944), at
237 B. E. Witkin, then Supreme Court Reporter, stated: "[T]he Supreme Court,
unlike the District Court of Appeal, has unlimited constitutional power to transfer
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case as "ordinary" or as "great and important" and see to it that it was
heard in the proper court. Writing in 1954, B. E. Witkin observed that
[t]he practice of the Supreme Court is to transfer nearly all direct
appeals in civil cases to the district courts of appeal. The result has
been that practically all cases in equity, cases involving title to
real property, cases involving the legality of a tax, etc., and pro-
bate matters, are now determined by the district courts of appeal
in the first instance, in exactly the same manner as if they were
appealed to those courts. 244
As amended in 1928, article VI divided the State into the same
number of districts as before (three) with one court of appeal for each
district;2 45 as was provided earlier in the 1918 amendment,
246 two of
the three district courts of appeal were to have two divisions of three
judges each.247 The Legislature was given power to increase the num-
ber of these divisions; also to create and establish additional courts of
appeal and divisions. Each division was to have and to exercise all the
powers of the court. In view of the practice of transferring "great
and important" cases to the Supreme Court, any two judges of a court
of appeal could properly review any "ordinary" case pending in that
court. 24 1 This meant that the courts of appeal and their divisions could
be multiplied indefinitely to take care of the ever-increasing judicial
business of the State.249
IV. Municipal Courts: 1924
As amended in 1924, article VI of the constitution authorized the
Legislature to establish a municipal court "in any city and county and
in any city which is governed under a charter framed and adopted under
the authority of this Constitution containing a population of more than
forty thousand inhabitants."25  Acting under the authority of this
amendment, the Legislature in 1925 passed "An act authorizing the
any case, pending either before itself or before a District Court of Appeal, for juris-
dictional or any other reasons. Hence it is unnecessary to consider at length where
the jurisdiction properly resides; in any doubtful case the Supreme Court may transfer
the appeal to itself, and thereafter its jurisdiction would be safe from attack, either
because it always had jurisdiction or because it obtained it by a transfer pursuant to
the authority given by Section 4c of the constitution."
244. 1 B. Wxrnrn, CALIFORNIA PROCEDUE Courts § 115, at 244 (1954).
245. CAL. CONsT. art. VI, § 4a.
246. CAL. CONsr. art. VI, § 4 (1918).
247. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 4a.
248. Id.
249. As of 1970, the Legislature had divided the State into five appellate districts.
CAL. Gov'T CODE § 69100. The Second Appellate District is the lagrest, consisting
of five divisions of four judges each. Id. § 69102.
250. CAL. CONsT. art. VI, § 1 (1924).
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establishment of municipal courts, prescribing their constitution, regu-
lation, government, procedure and jurisdiction, and providing for the
election and appointment of the judges, clerks, and other attaches of
such courts, their terms of office, qualification and compensation, and
for the selection of jurors therein."25' The courts were given jurisdic-
tion of misdemeanors committed within the county; cases at law involv-
ing $1000 or less; actions of forcible entry and detainer involving
rentals of $100 or less per month and damages of $1000 or less; and
cases to enforce liens on personal property involving $1000 or less.2" 2
According to Alden Ames, a Judge of the Municipal Court of San
Francisco and a member of the Judicial Council, "The idea of creating
the Municipal Court is to be credited to Justice John W. Shenk of our
Supreme Court and the late Judge Leslie Hewitt of Los Angeles." '253
In an earlier article he had referred to the courts established by the
Municipal Court Act of 1925 as "[t]he most recent, and, perhaps,
among the most important, additions to the California judicial sys-
tem. ' 2 4 In a speech delivered October 28, 1949, Chief Justice Gibson
stated, "Although the organizational basis of the municipal court is a
city, that court exercises exclusive jurisdiction within the county in cer-
tain cases and is generally supported by the county."
255
V. Judicial Council: 1926
A section added to article VI of the constitution in 1926 estab-
lished a Judicial Council, to consist of the Chief Justice or Acting
Chief Justice and of one associate justice of the Supreme Court, three
justices of courts of appeal, four judges of superior courts, one judge
of a police or municipal court, and one judge of an inferior court,
assigned by the Chief Justice for terms of 2 years. 256  The council was
directed to (1) meet at the call of the chairman; (2) survey the con-
251. Cal. Stat. 1925, ch. 358, at 648 (preamble).
252. Id. §§ 28-29, at 658.
253. Ames, Municipal Court Trial and Practice, 13 CAL. ST. B.J., Dec. 1967-
Jan. 1968, at 23.
254. Ames, The Origin and Jurisdiction of the Municipal Courts in California,
21 CALIF. L. REv. 117 (1933). "The first city to take advantage of the Act was
Long Beach, which established a municipal court of five judges commencing to func-
tion on July 24, 1925. Los Angeles followed on December 1, 1925, with a court
composed of 24 judges, which number has since been increased to 30. The municipal
court in San Francisco began to function on July 1, 1930, with 12 judges. These
courts succeeded and displaced in their respective cities the existing justices' and police
courts and also took over the small claims courts." Id.
255. Gibson, Reorganization of our Inferior Courts, 24 CAL. ST. B.J. 382, 385
(1949).
256. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § la (1926).
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dition of business in the several courts with a view toward simplifying
and improving the administration of justice; (3) submit such sugges-
tions to the several courts as might seem in the interest of uniformity
and the expedition of business; (4) report to the Governor and Legis-
lature with recommendations; (5) adopt or amend rules of practice
and procedure for the several courts; (6) submit to the Legislature rec-
ommendations regarding changes in existing laws relating to practice
and procedure; (7) exercise such other functions as may be provided
by law.257 The chairman was directed to expedite judicial business and
to equalize the work of the judges; to assign any judge to another court
of a like or higher jurisdiction to assist in clearing a congested calendar;
or to act where a judge has been disqualified or unable to act, or where
a vacancy has occurred.25 The Clerk of the Supreme Court was di-
rected to act as secretary of the council.259
In Minimum Standards of Judicial Administration,260 published
for the National Conference of Judicial Councils in 1949, Arthur T.
Vanderbilt stated:
California's council has no provision for representation by either
the bar or the legislative committees, yet its achievements have...
been outstanding. Furthermore, it has statutory powers of manage-
ment possessed by no other judicial council in the country, i.e.,
the power to shift judges of any court according to the needs
of litigation and also the power to promulgate rules of appellate
procedure.
The omissions referred to by Justice Vanderbilt were supplied by a 1960
amendment to article VI which added to the council four members of
the state bar and one member of each house of the Legislature."'
VT. Superior Courts: 1928
Instead of vesting the superior courts with jurisdiction of specified
types of civil cases, as had been done previously, article VI of the con-
stitution as amended in 1928 simply provided that the courts should
have "original jurisdiction in all civil cases and proceedings" except
those assigned to lower courts and except as otherwise provided in the




260. A.B.A. Nium STANDmns oiF JUDIcIAL ADMmSTATioN 72 (A. Vanderbilt
ed. 1949).
261. CAL,. CONST. art. VI, § la (1960) (now CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 6).
262. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 5 (1928).
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cases arising in municipal courts, justices' courts, and in other inferior
courts.
The amended article authorized the Legislature to provide "for the
establishment of appellate departments of the superior court in any
county or city and county wherein any municipal court is established,
and for the constitution, regulation, jurisdiction, government and pro-
cedure of such appellate departments. "26 3 A similar authorization had
been included in the 1924 amendment,2"4 but had not been acted upon
by the Legislature. A detailed "history" of the legislation which fol-
lowed the adoption of the 1928 amendment will be found in Whittaker
v. Superior Court,2 65 decided by the Supreme Court in 1968. Attached
to the Whittaker opinion is a list of all California counties showing the
population of each, the number of superior court judges, and the ex-
istence or lack of a municipal court. More than half the counties had
no municipal court and, therefore, no superior court appellate depart-
ment. The court held that a statute2 66 which had provided appellate
departments only for counties having municipal courts was valid.267
A superior court might or might not have a probate department
depending on the number of judges. In Schlyen v. Schlyen2 s68 decided
by the Supreme Court in 1954, Acting Chief Justice Shenk gave the
following instructive account of the manner of dealing with probate
matters:
In a one-judge county the court entertains and disposes of
probate cases as a superior court. The judge in such a county is
not required to adjourn as a court exercising general jurisdiction
and to reconvene as a probate court in order to dispose of matters
in probate. He disposes of them on his calendar along with
other cases, applying of necessity the rules of procedure espe-
cially applicable to probate cases.
263. Id.
264. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 5 (1924).
265. 68 Cal. 2d 357, 438 P.2d 358, 66 Cal. Rptr. 710 (1968).
266. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 77.
267. In Whittaker, Justice Sullivan, continuing his legislative history of CAL. CODE
CIV. PROC. § 77, stated: "In November of 1966 the constitutional provisions re-
lating to appellate departments found in former article VI, section 5, were repealed;
the new section dealing with appellate jurisdiction-article VI, section 11-makes no
specific mention of appellate departments and provides as here relevant only that
'Superior Courts have appellate jurisdiction in causes prescribed by statute that arise
in municipal and justice courts in their counties.' Official commentary on the new
provision indicates that the deletion of earlier constitutional language specifically
dealing with appellate departments is intended only to render the matter subject to
legislative control." 68 Cal. 2d 357, 361 n.2, 438 P.2d 358, 362 n.2, 66 Cal. Rptr. 710,
714 n.2 (1968).
268. 43 Cal. 2d 361, 273 P.2d 897 (1954).
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In counties having two superior court judges probate pro-
ceedings are usually entertained and determined in accordance
with the mutual convenience of the judges who likewise apply to
such matters the rules and regulations applicable in probate prac-
tice.
In counties where there are more than two judges there is a
presiding judge whose duty it is to distribute the business of the
court among the judges and to prescribe the order of business.
(Const., art. VI, § 7.) There may be at least one department of
that superior court devoted largely if not exclusively to the handl-
ing of probate matters. Such a department is established generally
by court rule or by special order of court. When so designated pro-
bate matters usually go by court rule to that department. But that
does not mean that a probate matter, a will contest, for example,
may not by order of the presiding judge or other appropriate
court order be transferred for trial from the probate department to
a department of the court normally exercising general jurisdiction.
In this connection it may be noted that when so transferred for
trial a will contest does not lose its identity as a part of the pro-
bate proceedings.
269
An act of the Legislature approved April 22, 1931, provided "that
at least one session of the superior court shall be held in each city con-
taining a population of not less than forty-five thousand . . . wherein
the city hall of said city is not less than eight miles from the site of the
county courthouse. 2 70 Later statutes provided that the places of
holding branch courts should be at least fourteen miles apart,
271 while
reducing the population requirement to thirty-five thousand.
27 2  In
1959, a Commissioner of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County
called attention to the great need for branch courts in his county, "the
most populous county in the United States," and pointed out that "the
branch system of that county [which he described in detail] is the one
which has been developed more extensively than that of any other Cali-
fornia county."M
27
VII Election of Judges and the Commission on
Judicial Appointments: 1934
A section added to article VI in 1934 provided that any justice of
the Supreme Court, or of a court of appeal, or any judge of a superior
court of a county adopting the plan, may file a declaration of candidacy
to succeed himself.2 7 4 If he did not do so, the Governor was to nom-
269. Id. at 371-72, 273 P.2d at 902.
270. Cal. Stat 1931, ch. 182, § 1, at 299.
271. CAL. Gov'T CoDE § 69749.
272. Id. § 69742.
273. Marshall, The Branch Court, 47 CALn'. L. REv. 689 (1959).
274. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 26 (1934) (now CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 16).
inate a suitable person for the office. 75 In either event the name of
such candidate was to be placed on the ballot in a form calling for
"yes" or "no" to a question asking whether the candidate should be
elected.2 76  If a vacancy occurred by reason of the failure of a candidate
to be elected or otherwise, the Governor was to appoint a suitable per-
son to fill the vacancy.
Any nomination or appointment by the Governor was to be inef-
fective unless approved by a majority of a Commission on Qualifications
consisting of the Chief Justice or Acting Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, the presiding justice of a court of appeal, and the Attorney
General. By a new section added in 1960,277 the name of the commis-
sion was changed to "Commission on Judicial Appointments."
In a case before the Supreme Court in 1939,278 Acting Chief
Justice Shenk stated:
The new method of electing Justices of the Supreme Court and Jus-
tices of the District Courts of Appeal has brought about an im-
portant change in the method of their selection. But they have
continued to be elective officers as distinguished from appointive
officers of the state ...
The language of the new section 26 and of the older sections
of the same article which were left undisturbed indicate without
question that the Justices of the Supreme Court hold and continue to
occupy their offices only at the will of the electorate. 279
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 26a (1960) (now CAL. CONSr. art. VI, § 7).
278. Carter v. Commission on Qualifications of Judicial Appointments, 14 Cal.
2d 179, 93 P.2d 140 (1939).
279. Id. at 188-89, 93 P.2d at 145. At a meeting of the California State Bar
on October 12, 1929, Henry E. Monroe, former President of the Bar Association of
San Francisco, gave a talk entitled "The Commonwealth Club Plan" in which he
stated: "What is the Commonwealth Club plan? It proposes that all judges in office
shall retain their office, and when the term of any judge is about to expire, if he
desires reelection, he must simply file a declaration of that intention. If this is done,
that name, and that name alone, goes on the ballot, and the only question is: 'Shall
judge So and So be retained in office?' If the electorate says 'Yes,' he holds that
office for another term. If the electorate says 'No,' then the Governor appoints some-
one to fill the vacancy, and at the next election that name, and that name alone, goes
on the ballot and the question is: "'Shall the appointment of So and So, judge for
such and such court, be confirmed?'" 2 CAL. ST. B. PROCEEDINGS 115, 119 (1929).
Mr. Monroe pointed out that the four or five thousand members of the Common-
wealth Club were, almost unanimously, in favor of the plan, and willing to work for
its adoption. Id. According to Malcolm Smith, The California Method of Selecting
Judges, 3 STAN. L. REV. 571, 573 (1951), the Commonwealth Club had been interested
in finding some method of securing the appointment, instead of the election, of
judges since 1912.
In 1934 a proposal was made that appointments by the Governor be made by
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VIII. Municipal and Justice Courts: 1950
In 1947 the Legislature requested the Judicial Council to study
the courts below the superior courts, and to make recommendations
for their improvement.2 80 In 1948 the council made a report pointing
out defects in the existing system, and recommending the adoption
of a constitutional amendment and certain statutes needed to establish
a new system. 2 81 According to the council's report, "the principal de-
fect" in the existing system was "the multiplicity of tribunals and their
duplication of functions," there being "six separate and distinct types
of inferior courts, totaling 767 in number, created and governed under
varied constitutional, statutory and charter provisions. '2 82  The Legis-
lature, in the Court Act of 1949, enacted the recommended statutes,2 8
providing that they should go into effect if and when the proposed
constitutional amendment should be adopted. In 1950 the voters ap-
proved the proposed amendment; by so doing, in effect, they approved
the entire system.
As amended, the constitution directed the Legislature to provide
for the division of each county into judicial districts, and for the estab-
lishment of a municipal or justice court in each district.284 A municipal
selecting one of two candidates named by a nominating commission. "The Common-
wealth Club, which had originally taken up the cause, became interested in this
proposal as did the State Chamber of Commerce. The State Chamber of Commerce
proposed a change to a confirmation commission, rather than a nominating commis-
sion, which was to be called a Commission on Qualifications. This change the Com-
monwealth Club later approved, and then with the addition of a county local option
clause, the plan was ready for submission to the voters." Nelson, Variations on a
Theme-Selection and Tenure of Judges, 36 S. CAL. L. REv. 4, 21 (1962).
280. Sen. Con. Res. No. 19, Cal. Stat. 1947, ch. 47, at 3448.
281. JuDIcAL CouNciL OF CALFom, 1948 REPORT TO THE GoVERNOR AND
THE LEGISLATURE 13-73. An extensive quotation from the report will be found in
Vanderbilt, supra note 260, at 308-09.
282. Id. at 15. Continuing, the report stated: "The jurisdiction of those courts
overlaps, since in almost every instance each court serves a locality which is also
served by at least one other court. Conflict and uncertainty in jurisdiction is one re-
sult of such multiplicity and duplication. Another result is that many courts are
operated on a part-time basis and are presided over by laymen engaged in outside
businesses or by lawyers engaged in private practice." Id. For the beginning of
this confusion, see text accompanying notes 47-62 supra. Chief Justice Gibson de-
livered a speech at Modesto before the Stanislaus Bar Association on October 28,
1949, in which he demonstrated the need for reform, and outlined in some detail steps
taken to accomplish the reform. He referred to a study made by the Judicial Council
some 10 years earlier, and to the fact that the State Bar, the Justices' and Constables'
Association, the Commonwealth Club of California, the Lawyers Club of Los Angeles,
and many others had made recommendations. 24 CAL. ST. B.J. 382 (1949).
283. Cal. Stat. 1949, chs. 1286, 1510-18, at 2268, 2681-702.
284. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 11 (1950) (now CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 5).
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court was to be established in each district of over 40,000 population,
and in each consolidated city and county; a justice court was to be es-
tablished in each district of 40,000 or less.2"5 The Legislature was fur-
ther directed to provide by general law for the "regulation, government,
procedure, and jurisdiction" of the new courts, and to "fix by law the
powers, duties, and responsibilities of such courts and of the judges
thereof." The amendment declared that, with the exception of such
municipal or justice courts, there should be no other court inferior to
the superior court, and provided that pending business and all records
of the superseded courts be transferred to the municipal or justice courts
in the district.286
Writing in 1949, Arthur T. Vanderbilt remarked, "If this amend-
ment is ratified, California will join the states having a statewide system
of courts of limited jurisdiction. 1 8 7  According to Dorothy W. Nelson,
"The objectives of the 1950 reorganization plan were to reduce the
number and types of courts, to have a court structure adaptable to ur-
ban and rural areas, to have a court reasonably accessible to the inhab-
itants of each community, and to have a uniform system throughout
the state responsive to changing conditions."2 88 In her enthusiasm she
stated that the 1950 reorganization of the lower courts was "[t]he most
important reform to take place in the California judicial system in the
past 100 years. '  The Court Act of 1949, passed in anticipation of
the adoption of the constitutional amendment, authorized as many con-
current sessions of a municipal or justice court as there were judges,
declaring that the judgments, orders, and proceedings of any session
should be "equaliy effectual as though all the judges of said court pre-
sided at such session. '290 It was further provided that a municipal
court with more than five judges might keep one department open for
criminal business all hours of the day or night and on legal holidays.2 91
285. Anticipating the adoption of the Amendment, the Legislature, by an act
approved July 27, 1949, had provided that "[als public convenience requires, the board
of supervisors shall divide the county into judicial districts for the purpose of electing
judges and other officers of municipal and justice courts." Cal. Stat. 1949, ch. 1511,
§ 1, at 2694, as amended, CAL. GOV'T CODE § 71040.
286. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 11 (1950).
287. Vanderbilt, supra note 260, at 309.
288. Nelson, Should Los Angeles County Adopt a Single-Trial-Court Plan?, 33
S. CAL. L. REV. 117, 119 (1960).
289. Id.
290. Municipal and Justice Court Act of 1949, Cal. Stat. 1949, ch. 1510, § 17, at
2687, as amended, CAL. GOV'T CODE § 71340.
291. Id. § 34, at 2691, as amended, CAL. GOV'T CODE § 72300 (five changed to
three or more).
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The Court Act of 1949 provided that municipal and justice courts
should have jurisdiction of civil cases as provided in Code of Civil Pro-
cedure sections 89, 112, and 117.292 As amended in 1949, section 89
in effect denied municipal courts jurisdiction of cases involving the le-
gality of any tax, impost, assessment, toll or municipal fine;293 of forc-
ible entry or forcible or unlawful detainer involving rental values in
excess of $200 per month;294 of any and all cases involving more than
$2000.205 Subject to these exceptions and limitations, the court was
given jurisdiction over the following cases and proceedings: cases at
law; dissolution of a partnership; interpleader; cancellation or rescission
of a contract in connection with recovery of consideration; revision
of a contract in an action upon such contract; forcible entry or forcible
or unlawful detainer; enforcement and foreclosure of liens on personal
property; enforcement and foreclosure of liens of mechanics, artisans,
laborers, and others;296 cases in equity to try title to personal property;
equitable defenses. In an action within the court's jurisdiction it may
issue temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions; order
an accounting; appoint receivers; determine title to personal property
seized in the action or upon execution. 29 7 Penal Code section 1462
as amended in 194929 provided that each municipal court should have
jurisdiction of misdemeanors committed within the county except where
the juvenile or other court has exclusive jurisdiction. Of misdemeanors
within the jurisdiction of the justice court, the municipal court was
given concurrent jurisdiction. The court was given exclusive jurisdic-
tion of all violations of city and town ordinances within its district.
299
292. Cal. Stat. 1949, ch. 1510, § 15, at 2686.
293. Cal. Stat. 1949, ch. 1286, § 1, at 2268, as amended, CAL. CODE CIV. PROC.
§ 89. The 1968 amendment added: "[Sluch courts shall have jurisdiction in actions
to enforce payment of delinquent unsecured personal property taxes if the legality of
the tax is not contested by the defendant."
294. Id. at 2269. Since 1961, the amount has been $600. CAL. CODE CIV.
PROC. § 89(a)(4).
295. Id. at 2268. Since 1961, the amount has been $5000. CAL. CODE CIV.
PROC. § 89(a)(4).
296. Cal. Stat. 1949, ch. 1519, § 1, at 2703 [now CAL. CODE CiV. PROC. §89(a)(6)]
includes "all other persons to whom liens are given under the provisions of Chapter 2
[commencing with Section 1181], Title 4, Part 3 of this code . .. ."
297. Id. at 2702-03. In 1969, the court was given power "[t]o vacate a judgment
or order of such municipal court obtained through extrinsic fraud, mistake, inad-
vertence, or excusable neglect." CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 89(b)(3).
298. Cal. Stat. 1949, ch. 1518, § 2, at 2701.
299. Id. These provisions have continued unchanged. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1462.
For establishment and jurisdiction of the "Juvenile COurt," see CAL. WELF. & INST'Ns
CODE §§ 500-940. In Singer v. Bogen, 147 Cal. App. 2d 515, 524, 305 P.2d 893,
899 (1957), Fourt, J., stated: "The superior court is a court of general jurisdiction,
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Penal Code section 1425 as amended in 1949300 provided that
justice courts should have jurisdiction of misdemeanors committed
within the county punishable by fine not exceeding $1,000 or imprison-
ment not exceeding 6 months or both, except where other courts were
given exclusive jurisdiction, and of cases amounting to misdemeanors
under section 270 of the Penal Code. 301  Each justice court was given
exclusive jurisdiction over violations of ordinances of cities and towns
within its district. In 1949, Code of Civil Procedure section 112,302
in effect, denied justice courts jurisdiction of civil cases involving the
legality of any tax, impost, assessment, toll, or municipal fine;
30 3 of
cases involving title or possession of real estate; of proceedings in forc-
ible or unlawful detainer involving rental values in excess of $75 per
month;31 4 and of any and all cases involving more than $500.305 Sub-
ject to these exceptions and limitations the justice court was given juris-
diction of cases at law; forcible entry or forcible or unlawful detainer,
including the power to determine any question properly involved
therein; enforcement and foreclosure of liens on personal property;
proceedings to charge the interest of a debtor partner with payment
of an unsatisfied amount of a judgment rendered by the court (includ-
ing the power to appoint a receiver); proceedings to determine title to
personal property seized in a pending action or upon execution; and pro-
ceedings to appoint receivers of perishable property under Code of
Civil Procedure section 547a.30 6
and the juvenile court is but a part thereof. True it is that there are special pro-
cedures and rules adopted for proceedings in the juvenile court. However, when a
judge sits as a judge of the juvenile court, he is sitting as a judge of the superior
court, exercising a part of the general jurisdiction conferred by the law in such cases,
and is referred to as a judge of the juvenile court."
300. Cal. Stat. 1949, ch. 1518, § 1, at 2701, which was passed in anticipation of
the 1950 amendment to the constitution.
301. Section 1425 was amended in 1955 by adding misdemeanors "under section
502 of the Vehicle Code." Cal. Stat. 1955, ch. 1173, § 1, at 2185. A further amend-
ment in 1957 added misdemeanors "under subdivision (b) of section 476a of the Penal
Code." Cal. Stat. 1957, ch. 1193, § 1, at 2483.
302. Cal. Stat. 1949, ch. 1286, § 2, at 2269-70, which was passed in anticipation
of the 1950 constitutional amendment.
303. This provision was amended in 1968 by adding that "such courts shall have
jurisdiction in actions to enforce payment of delinquent and unsecured personal prop-
erty taxes if the legality of the tax is not contested by the defendant;..." Cal.
Stat. 1968, ch. 503, § 2, at 1147.
304. In 1959, the amount was increased from $75 to $125. Cal. Stat. 1959, ch.
880, § 1, at 2913.
305. In 1968, the upper limit was changed to $1000. Cal. Stat. 1968, ch. 1260,
§ 1, at 2378.
306. Cal. Stat. 1949, ch. 1286, § 2, at 2269-70. In 1959, the court's jurisdiction
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Code of Civil Procedure section 117, as amended in 1949307 and
again in 1951308 to conform to the constitutional amendment of 1950,
conferred on the judges of the municipal and justice courts jurisdiction
of cases for money only not exceeding $100, including actions for in-
jury to person and to personal property.309 While exercising this juris-
diction the judges were to be "known and referred to as the small
claims court." If the defendant had a counterclaim over $100, he might
commence an action on it in a proper court and have the small claims
case transferred to that court.310 In a 1964 study titled the "Cali-
fornia Small Claims Court,"31' it was pointed out that "[iun 1920 Mas-
sachusetts became the first state to pass a state-wide act of general appli-
cation to small claims actions. California passed a similar statute in
1921."'3 The study further pointed out that "[tlhe small claims court
is not a separate and independent judicial tribunal existing apart from
the other California courts; it is an adjunct to all municipal and justice
courts of the state and is 'in the nature of a special procedure.
'
IX. Removal of Judges and the Commission on
Judicial Qualifications: 1960
Section 10-b, added to article VI of the constitution in 1960,
provided that a justice or judge of any court of the State may be re-
moved for "willful misconduct in office or willful and persistent failure
to perform his duties or habitual intemperance, or he may be retired
for disability seriously interfering with the performance of his duties,
was extended to "actions under section 720 for the recovery of an interest in personal
property or to enforce the liability of a judgment debtor." Cal. Stat. 1959, ch. 1097,
§ 2, at 3169.
307. Cal. Stat. 1949, ch. 451, § 1, at 795.
308. Cal. Stat. 1951, ch. 1737, § 11, at 4083.
309. In 1957, the upper limit was increased from $100 to $150. Cal. Stat. 1957,
ch. 1201, § 1, at 2489. In 1967, the amount was increased to $300. Cal. Stat. 1967,
ch. 195, § 1, at 1303. The section was amended in 1955 to provide that in municipal
courts the small claims court should have jurisdiction in proceedings in unlawful de-
tainer. Cal. Stat. 1955, ch. 1927, § 1, at 3553. This provision was declared invalid
by the Supreme Court because of the summary nature of the small claims procedure.
Mendoza v. Small Claims Court, 49 Cal. 2d 668, 321 P.2d 9 (1958). In 1968, the
small claims courts were given "jurisdiction in actions to enforce payment of delinquent
unsecured personal property taxes if the legality of the tax is not contested by the
defendant." Cal. Stat. 1968, ch. 503, § 3, at 1148.
310. Cal. Stat. 1949, ch. 451, § 2, at 796 (now CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 117r).
311. Pagter, McCloskey & Reinis, The California Small Claims Court, 52 CAL.
L. R v. 876 (1964).
312. Id. at 877.
313. Id. at 878.
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which is, or is likely to become, of a permanent character. '314  This
new section authorized a commission, created by another 1960 amend-
ment,3 15 to order a hearing concerning the removal or retirement of a
justice or judge, and, after the hearing, to make a recommendation to
the Supreme Court to be approved or disapproved by that court. The
new section declared that the procedures provided were alternative to,
and cumulative with, the methods of removal of justices and judges
provided in article VI, section 10 (two-thirds vote of both houses of
the Legislature), article VI, section 10-a (removal by the Supreme
Court for crime involving moral turpitude), article IV, sections 17 and
18 (impeachment), and article XXIII (recall).316
Section 1-b, added to article VI in 1960, provided for a "Com-
mission on Judicial Qualifications" to consist of five judges appointed
by the Supreme Court, two lawyers named by the Governors of the
State Bar, and two non-lawyer citizens named by the Governor of the
State, each to serve 4 years. In an account of the establishment of
the commission,1 7 Jack E. Frankel, its "Executive Secretary," noted
that before the creation of the commission "the informed opinion was
unmistakable that the traditional remedies of impeachment, recall, and
concurrent legislative resolutions were inadequate."31  He added, how-
ever, that the scope of his article did not permit "a full discussion of
this history." '319 According to Frankel, "California's experience is
noteworthy inasmuch as apparently no other state has an independent
body with authority to receive information, make investigations, con-
duct hearings and recommend removal of judges for cause. 3 20  A
"full discussion" of the "history" referred to will be found in an article
published by Secretary Frankel in 1962.321
X. Revision of Article VI: 1966
Referring to the Constitution of 1879, Justice Temple, in an opin-
314. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 10b (1960).
315. Id. § 26a (1960).
316. Id. § 10b (1960); 41 OPs. CAL. Arr'Y GEN. 140 (1963).
317. Frankel, The Commission on Judicial Qualifications, 36 CAL. ST. B.J. 1008
(1961).
318. Id. at 1009.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Frankel, Judicial Conduct and Removal of Judges for Cause in California,
36 S. CAL. L. REv. 72 (1962). In the Opinion of the Attorney General, supra note
316, at 212, the secretary of the Commission on Judicial Qualifications was advised
that the Judicial Council had authority to provide for the temporary suspension of a
judge involved in a matter before the commission, but that the Legislature was without
authority to enact a statute on the subject.
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ion delivered in 1902,822 stated: "When the Federal constitution and
first state constitutions were formed, the idea of a constitution was that
it merely outlined a government, provided for certain departments and
some officers and defined their functions, secured some absolute and in-
alienable rights to the citizens, but left all matters of administration and
policy to the departments which it created. The law-making power
was vested wholly in the legislature. . . . Latterly, however, all this
has been changed. Through distrust of the legislature and the natural
love of power, the people have inserted in their constitutions many
provisions of a statutory character. 3 23  Charles S. Cushing, after quot-
ing the above passage, pointed out that "[it was the revolutionary
character of this [1879] constitution with its minutiae of regulation
that caused James Bryce to select it in the first edition of his American




, In a'speech before the Commonwealth Club of California in Sep-
tember 1969, Bruce W. Sumner, a member of the Legislature from
1957 to 1962 and chairman of the Constitution Revision Commission
since 1965, reported:
Some of us in the legislature during the late 1950's and early
1960's thought that another approach should be taken. In 1962
the people were asked the question: Do you want the Legislature
to submit to you a new constitution? The proposition passed by
a 2-1 vote.
The legislature appointed the Constitution Revision Commis-
sion. This makes our group wholly distinctive, being appointed by
the legislature. We serve at the pleasure of the legislature but we
adopt our own rules, elect our own officers and set our own pro-
cedure.3
25
Commenting on the role of the Legislature in the process of constitu-
tional revision, he further stated that "California is recognized through-
out this nation as having the finest state legislature."326
Revisions of the articles dealing with the legislature, executive
branch, and the judiciary were approved by the Legislature and the
voters in 1966. Other proposed revisions submitted to the voters in
1968 and again in 1970 were not approved. According to Chairman
322. Winchester v. Howard, 136 Cal. 432, 69 P. 77 (1902).
323. Id. at 439, 69 P. at 78-79.
324. Cushing, The Acquisition of California, Its Influence and Development Un-
der American Rule, 8 CALIF. L. REV. 67 (1920). For "distrust of the legislature," see
comments by BRYCE, supra note 188.
325. Address by Bruce W. Sumner to the Commonwealth Club of California,
Sept. 15, 1969, in THE COMMONWEALTH, Vol. LXIII, at 233.
326. Id. at 234.
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Sumner,32 "Relatively few substantive changes were proposed in the
operation of the judicial branch, since California's system is envied by
most of the nation." The chief reasons for revision were (1) to make
a few substantive changes; (2) to eliminate repealed and obsolete pro-
visions; and (3) to delete matters deemed to be legislative in character
so as to subject them to legislative control.3 2
The following is an outline of the court system established by
article VI as revised in 1966:
COURTS OF JUSTICE
Supreme Court-to consist of the Chief Justice and six asso-
ciate justices; may be convened at any time; to be a court of
record.
Courts of Appeal-one, with one or more divisions, for each
appellate district; each division to consist of a presiding jus-
tice and two or more associate justices; to be courts of record.
Superior Courts-one, with one or more judges, for each
county; judge or judges to serve more than one court if Legis-
lature so provides and counties involved approve; to be
courts of record.
Municipal Courts-one for each judicial district of more than
40,000 residents; to have one or more judges; to be courts
of record.
Justice Courts-one for each judicial district of 40,000 resi-
dents or less; to have one or more judges; not to be courts
of record.
JUDICIAL OFFICERS
Justices of the Supreme Court-to be elected at large at
general elections; to hold office for 12 years.
Justices of Courts of Appeal-to be elected in their districts
at general elections; to hold office for 12 years.
327. Sumner, The California Constitution Revision Commission, in CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES * * * CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 109, 115
(California Legislature pub. 1969). See Mason, Constitutional History of California,
in id. at 75.
328. See, e.g., Whittaker v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. 2d 357, 361, 438 P.2d 358,
362, 66 Cal. Rptr. 710, 714 (1968).
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Judges of Superior Courts-to be elected in their counties at
general elections; to hold office for 6 years.
Judges of Municipal Courts-to be elected in their districts
at general elections; no provision for term of office.
Judges of Justice Courts-to be elected in their districts at
general elections; no provision for term of office.
Commissioners-Legislature may provide for appointment by
trial courts of record of officers to perform subordinate judi-
cial duties.
OTHER OFFICERS AND RELATED AGENCIES
County Clerk-to be ex officio clerk of superior court of
county.
Judicial Council-to consist of the Chief Justice and fourteen
other judges, four members of the state bar, and one member
of each house of the Legislature.
Commission on Judicial Appointments-to consist of the
Chief Justice, Attorney General, and presiding justice of the
court of appeal of the affected district.
Commission on Judicial Qualifications-to consist of five
judges, two members of the state bar, and two citizens who
are not judges or members of the state bar.
State Bar-a public corporation; all persons admitted to prac-
tice law to be members, except while judges of courts of
record.
SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION
Supreme Court-court and justices to have original jurisdic-
tion in habeas corpus proceedings; court to have original
jurisdiction in proceedings for extraordinary relief in nature
of mandamus, certiorari, and prohibition; appellate jurisdic-
tion of death-sentence cases; jurisdiction of cases transferred,
at its discretion, from courts of appeal.
Courts of Appeal-same original jurisdiction as Supreme
Court; appellate jurisdiction of all cases originating in supe-
rior courts (except death-sentence cases) and in other causes
prescribed by statute; jurisdiction of cases transferred to them
by the Supreme Court.
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Superior Courts-same original jurisdiction as Supreme
Court; original jurisdiction of all cases except those given by
statute to other trial courts; appellate jurisdiction of causes
prescribed by statute arising in municipal and justice courts.
Municipal Courts-to be prescribed by Legislature.
Justice Courts-to be prescribed by Legislature.
VENUE AND RANGE OF PROCESS
No provisions.
Roscoe Pound, who favored the department system, wrote in
1940:329
In California, the Supreme Court since 1922 has habitually sat in
bank, the reports showing the court sitting in departments only
in 1928. The reasons given do not seem convincing, 330 and it is
significant that in consequence the court is again over-burdened
and propositions to restrict its jurisdiction are being urged [citing
Cal. St. B. Proceedings 284-85 (1938)]. 3 3 1
Explaining the ultimate renunciation in 1966 of the Supreme Court
department system, Judge Sumner, chairman of the Revision Commis-
sion, wrote:
The former Constitution provided for Supreme Court operation in
two separate departments to relieve heavy caseloads. With the
creation of district courts of appeal in 1904, the department sys-
tem became obsolete and never was used again. The 1966 revision
[of article VI] recognized this fact and deleted this obsolete pro-
vision.332
Thus, article VI, as revised in 1966, provided that the "[c]oncurrence
of 4 judges present at the argument is necessary for a judgment. ' '333
329. R. POUND, supra note 149, at 214.
330. In note 1, at 214, Pound stated: "Mr. Justice Preston, California's Appel-
late Problems, 6 Cal. State Bar J. 291, 296 (1931), giving as the reason that 'there
seems to be a feeling in the minds of the bar that when cases come up from the
district court of appeal they are entitled to be heard in bank, and that the bar would
not be satisfied with a department opinion.' Yet when the matter was submitted to
vote of the state bar, a proposition to urge the Supreme Court to 'hear a substantial
number of cases in department' was carried overwhelmingly-2265 for and 999
against. The Recent Bar Plebiscite, 7 Cal. State Bar J. 270 (1932)."
331. Continuing, Pound writes: "In particular, the practice of sitting in bank
rather than in departments has deprived oral argument of real value, and in effect
required submission of cases on briefs of counsel. As the authority to sit in depart-
ments is not used, propositions are made to abrogate it." Id. at 214. R. POUND, supra
note 149, at 214.
332. Sumner, supra note 327, at 114.
333. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
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Relief of the Supreme Court workload by the use of commission-
ers Was, in effect, denied; for although section 22 of the revised article
authorized the Legislature to provide for the appointment "by trial
courts of record" of officers such as commissioners to perform sub-
ordinate judicial duties, it failed to include a similar provision for the
Supreme Court.
334
The 1904 division of appellate business between the Supreme
Court and the new, courts of appeal 3 5 necessitated jurisdictional deci-
sions, and was of little or no value in directing "great and important"
cases to the Supreme Court and the "ordinary current of cases" to the
courts of appeal. Using an elaborate system of transfers, the cases
were sorted and heard in the appropriate court. By 1954 "nearly all"
direct appeals to the Supreme Court in civil cases were transferred to
and heard in the courts of appeal. As revised in 1966, section 11 of
article VI provided: "The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction
when judgment of death has been pronounced. With that exception
courts of appeal have appellate jurisdiction when superior courts have
original jurisdiction and in other cases prescribed by statute." Section
12 provided: "The Supreme Court may, before decision becomes final,
transfer to itself a cause in a court of appeal. It may, before decision,
transfer a cause from itself to a court of appeal or from one court of
appeal or division to another." By these provisions the jurisdictional
problems were eliminated, and the Supreme Court was left almost com-
pletely free to choose the appeals it wanted to hear.
Whittaker v. Superior Court,336 a 1968 case, provides a good illus-
tration of the transfer practice. Misdemeanor convictions in a justice
court were reviewed by one judge of the superior court. That court
had no appellate department because the county had no municipal
court.387 Claiming a denial of due process and equal protection, on
the ground that in many other counties similar convictions were re-
viewed by a three-judge appellate department, the defendants peti-
tioned the court of appeal for a writ of mandamus to compel the
superior court to convene a three-judge appellate department to hear
the appeals. After issuing an order to show cause, the court of appeal
granted the petition.338 The Supreme Court then transferred the case
.334. Id. at § 22.
335. CAL. CONsT. art. VI, §§ 1, 4 (1904). See text accompanying notes 239-44
supra.
336. 68 Cal. 2d 357, 438 P.2d 358, 66 Cal. Rptr. 710 (1968).
337. See id. at 360 n.2, 438 P.2d at 362 n.2, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 714 n.2.
338. Id. at 360, 438 P.2d at 361, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 713.
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to itself and, after a hearing in bank, discharged the order to show
cause, and denied the petition.339 Referring to the decision of the
court of appeal, Justice Sullivan stated:
In view of the far-reaching effect of this decision, and of the
necessity that the issues involved be determined by the higher
courts at the earliest possible opportunity, we transferred the mat-
ter to this court on our own motion and without waiting for the de-
cision to become final as to the Court of Appeal. (See Cal. Const.,
art. VI, § 12; 1967 Judicial Council Report 77; Witkin, New Rules
on Appeal, Part IV, Hearing and Determination of Appeal (1944)
17 So.Cal. L.Rev. 232, 267-268.)340
Prior to 1966 the civil appeals filed in the Supreme Court aver-
aged about 270 per year.3 41 It has been stated that elimination of
these filings will not affect the workload of the court, since "[e]ven
prior to the 1966 change in the Constitution the court followed a policy
of transferring to the Courts of Appeal all causes appealed directly to
it, except death penalty cases, cases of public importance, emergency
matters, and cases involving questions similar to those in other pending
litigation. Appeals which the Supreme Court would have previously
retained under this policy will in most instances now come before the
court by petition for hearing or by transfer on the court's own mo-
tion.
3 42
As revised in 1966, article VI of the constitution provided, "If
the governing body of each affected county concurs, the Legislature
may provide that one or more judges serve more than one superior
court. '3 43  Noting that the 1966 revision continued the requirement of
a superior court in each county, the chairman of the Constitution Re-
vision Commission stated that deletion of the requirement of at least
one judge in each county "provides financial savings to small counties
that do not need the full-time services of a superior court judge and
which prefer to share a judge with other counties. '344
It is interesting to note that a similar deletion was proposed in the
Constitutional Convention of 1878-1879 .1 4  Delegates at that conven-
tion who were familiar with the old district court system had vigorously
protested the proposed deletion, pointing out the need of having a
339. Id. at 372, 438 P.2d at 370, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 722.
340. Id. at 360, 438 P.2d at 361-62, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 713-14.
341. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, 1969 REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE
LEGISLATURE 119.
342. Id. at 120.
343. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 4.
344. Sumner, supra note 327, at 114.
345. See text accompanying note 188 supra.
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superior court judge, especially to act as probate judge, present in the
county at all times. They had regarded the efficient transaction of
the court's business as more important than the saving of expense. The
proposal was defeated 70 to 45.340
In addition to the 1966 changes to article VI mentioned above,
Judge Sumner, chairman of the Constitution Revision Commission,
calls attention to changes made in 1966 with respect to the qualifica-
tions, election and control of judges. 347  He summarizes two of these
changes as follows:
Five years admission to practice law in this state was required
by the former Constitution for eligibility to a judgeship in any
court of record. To encourage placement of experienced men as
judges, the 1966 revision increased the admission requirements to
10 years for future judges of the superior and appellate courts.
The former Constitution provided that the names of incumbent
judges of the superior court in counties of 700,000 population or
more need not appear on the election ballot if no one ran against
them or petitioned to have the name appear. This system met
with widespread approval and the 1966 revision allowed the Legis-
lature to extend it to any trial court in the state without regard to
population.
348
As revised in 1966, article VI of the constitution declared that
"superior courts, and their judges have original jurisdiction in habeas
corpus proceedings. Those courts also have original jurisdiction in
proceedings for extraordinary relief in the nature of mandamus, cer-
tiorari, and prohibition; . . .original jurisdiction in all causes except
those given by statute to other trial courts; . . .appellate jurisdiction
in causes prescribed by statute that arise in municipal and justice courts
in their counties. 3 49 The causes "given by statute to other trial courts"
were not specified, but were to be found in the statutes which had
fully developed the jurisdiction of the municipal and justice courts be-
ginning in 1949.380
XL Summary and Comment
At various times during their distinguished careers, both Roscoe
Pound and Arthur T. Vanderbilt expressed their individual views on
modem court organizations. Vanderbilt, after pointing out that "mul-
tiplicity of courts" is characteristic of "an immature system of law,"
346. 1 CAiFoRNA CONsTrrTroNAL CONVENTiON, supra note 134, at 976.
347. Sumner, supra note 327, at 115.
348. Id.
349. CAL. CoNsT. art. VI, §§ 10-11.
350. See text accompanying notes 292-313 supra.
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stated that "all the courts any American state really needs" are three:
a general trial court with statewide jurisdiction of every kind of case;
a local court for the trial of minor cases; and an appellate tribunal to
review questions of law. 51 Noting that very few of our states have
achieved "this ideal of the three-court system," Vanderbilt observed
that "the degree to which they have progressed in this direction is one
measure of their judicial civilization."3 52  He did recognize, however,
that intermediate courts of appeal must be provided as needed in the
larger states.353 Pound, on the other hand, thought "[ilt should be
possible for the supreme court to sit in divisions if necessary for the
prompt dispatch of business." '54 Regional or local appellate terms of
the superior court should be provided making unnecessary "interme-
diate appellate tribunals of any sort."
As indicated by these opinions, progress in court development is
from the complex to the simple; from the multiple to the unitary. At
the beginning of California's court history the tendency was to solve
problems by adding new courts. 55 By 1878 there were "no less than
eleven grades of courts."35 6  The first great step towards "judicial civi-
lization" was taken when the Constitution of 1879 provided that a su-
perior court be established in each county in the place of district, county,
and probate courts.35 7 The second great step was taken in 1950 when
"six separate and distinct types of inferior courts, totaling 767 in num-
351. Vanderbilt, Brief for a Better Court System, N.Y. Times, May 5, 1957,
§ 6 (Magazine) at 9.
352. Id. at 67.
353. Id. at 9.
354. Pound, Principles and Outline of a Modern Unified Court Organization, 23
JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY 225, 227 (1940).
355. The Drafting Committee of the Constitutional Convention of 1849 proposed
the establishment of a unified Superior Court of four judges, each to try cases on cir-
cuit; three to sit as an appellate court to review the judgments of the fourth. See text
accompanying note 14 supra. This was the same as provided for the frontier territories
of the United States, but was rejected by the convention which favored separate
supreme and district courts. Judicial power was vested in a supreme court, district
courts, county courts, and justices of the peace. The Legislature, authorized to estab-
lish inferior courts, increased the number of types of courts from four to nine in the
California Court Act of 1851, outlined in text following note 67 supra.
356. Waymire, Our Judicial System, 1 PAC. COAST L.J. 367 (1878). Before listing
the "eleven different grades of courts," Waymire wrote: "In devising a plan of a
judicial system, no care should be spared to make it as simple as possible, and at the
same time to make it capable of meeting the wants of the people promptly. . . . In
this state we have come far short of it. Our system is both complicated and
inefficient." Id. at 369. Waymire proposed, "For the district, county, probate, and
criminal courts, substitute municipal courts-one for each county or city and county
capable of expansion into as many branches as may be necessary." Id. at 370.
357. See CAL. CONsT. art. VI, § 6 (1879). See text accompanying note 188 supra.
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ber, created and governed under varied constitutional, statutory and
charter provisions," were replaced by two statewide types of local
courts-municipal courts and justice courts.358
When the first step was taken, intermediate appellate courts were
rejected in favor of the plan of having the Supreme Court sit in de-
partments. When this plan failed, intermediate appellate courts be-
came necessary.
The superior courts established in 1879 were statewide in the
sense that their process extended to all parts of the State. The plan of
having only one superior court in the State with branches in the several
counties was not considered. As originally constituted, the superior
courts were to be always open for business, and each judge of a multi-
judge court was authorized to hold the court alone. The latter provi-
sion made it possible to take care of increasing judicial business by
adding judges instead of establishing additional courts. The present
writer has no way of knowing whether California's court system "is en-
vied by most of the nation," '359 but does conclude that California is far
advanced in "judicial civilization."
358. See text accompanying notes 280-91 supra.
359. Sumner, supra note 327, at 14.
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